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Summary 
 
Knowledge development for innovation often occurs in a regulated environment, raising the 
question whether regulation inhibits knowledge development. In most regulated industries, 
organizations are required to submit their new products to a regulator to get approval pre-
diffusion for consumption. Innovating organizations routinely perceive those responsible for 
implementation and enforcement of the regulations as incompetent, lacking in both 
understanding and capacity to evaluate the new innovations. The typical regulator's strategic 
knowledge posture is therefore regarded as knowledge exploitation of already existing products 
and services, due to the perceived lack of incentive to enable innovation and knowledge 
creation. 
Classical economic theory affirms the view of regulation as a compliance burden that increases 
opportunity costs for innovating organizations, since many resources used to comply with 
regulatory requirements could have been used for innovation efforts instead. The Porter 
Hypothesis (1991) counters this view of the relationship between regulation and innovation 
based on empirical evidence that, where the environment allows, regulation induces innovation 
and enhances competitiveness. 
The thesis proceeds from the Porter Hypothesis and aims to highlight specific instances where 
knowledge development was enhanced by the regulator. To do this, the thesis focuses on 
gambling regulation in South Africa and takes the development of the Electronic Bingo 
Terminals (EBT) gambling product as a case study. Through document review and interviews 
of stakeholders in the EBT product development and regulation process, empirical evidence is 
presented of instances where the public regulator induced knowledge development and 
supported innovation. A data analysis framework inspired by Boisot's (1998) I-space and 
Schumpeterian learning is used to analyse the interview and documentary data about how the 
EBT product came into existence and to highlight the knowledge creation and development 
aspects identified in the process of evaluating and approving the EBTs by the public regulator. 
It is demonstrated that the EBT product was unlikely to meet the diffusion requirements and 
the success thresholds in the gambling market without the knowledge contribution from the 
public regulator. The contribution from the regulator was found to spring from knowledge 
embedded in its employees, their practices and operational methods. For this reason, it is argued 
that such contributions are likely to manifest in other products and approval requests. It is 
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concluded that the public regulator supported knowledge development in several ways in the 
case of the development of EBTs and that a closer look at regulatory knowledge contribution 
offers an important perspective on the management of knowledge for innovation.  
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Opsomming 
 
Kennisontwikkeling vir innovasie vind gereeld in 'n gereguleerde omgewing plaas, wat die 
vraag laat ontstaan of regulasie kennisontwikkeling inhibeer of nie. In die meeste 
gereguleerde industrieë word van organisasies verwag om toestemming van die reguleerder te 
kry alvorens nuwe produkte versprei mag word. Innoverende organisasies sien gewoonlik die 
reguleerder as inkompetent, met 'n tekort aan beide insig en vermoë om die nuwe produkte te 
evalueer. Die tipiese reguleerder se strategiese kennishouding word gesien as kennis-
eksploitasie van reeds bestaande produkte en dienste, aangesien die insentief om innovasie en 
kennis-skepping te ondersteun blyk te ontbreek. 
Klassieke ekonomiese teorie bevestig die siening van regulasie as 'n nakomingslas was die 
geleentheidskoste vir innoverende organisasies verhoog, want baie bronne wat toegespits word 
op regulasies kon eerder vir innovasie gebruik word. Die Porter Hipotese (1991) stem nie met 
hierdie siening van die verhouding tussen innovasie en regulasie saam nie, gebaseer op 
empiriese bewyse dat, waar die omgewing toelaat, regulasie innovasie kan induseer en 
kompeteerbaarheid verbeter. 
Die tesis beweeg van die Porter Hipotese uit en poog om spesifieke gevalle waar 
kennisontwikkeling deur die reguleerder ondersteun is te bespreek. Die tesis fokus op 
dobbelregulasie in Suid-Afrika en beskryf 'n gevallestudie van die ontwikkeling van 
Elektroniese Bingo Terminale (EBTs) as 'n dobbelproduk. Deur dokument-analise en 
onderhoude met persone betrokke by die produkontwikkeling- en goedkeuringsproses van 
EBTs, word empiriese bewyse aangevoer van geleenthede waar die publieke reguleerder 
kennisontwikkeling en kennis-skepping aangehelp het. 'n Data-analise raamwerk geïnspireer 
deur Boisot (1998) se I-space en Schumpteriaanse leerproses is gebruik om die onderhoud en 
dokumentêre data te analiseer oor hoe die EBT produk ontstaan het en om die kennis-skepping 
en kennisontwikkelingsaspekte te identifiseer in die proses van evaluasie en goedkeuring van 
die EBTs deur die publieke reguleerder.  
Daar word gedemonstreer dat die EBT produk onwaarskynlik die verspreidingsvereistes en die 
suksesmerk in die dobbelmark sou bereik het, as dit nie vir die kennisbydra van die publieke 
reguleerder was nie. Daar is gevind dat die bydrae van die reguleerder van die kennis ingebed 
in werknemers, hulle praktyke en operasionele metodes spruit. Vir hierdie rede word 
geargumenteer dat sulke bydraes moontlik ook in ander produkte en goedkeuringsnavrae 
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neerslag mag vind. Daar word afgesluit met die waarneming dat die publieke reguleerder 
kennisontwikkeling op verskeie maniere ondersteun het in die geval van EBTs en dat 
regulatoriese kennisbydraes 'n belangrike perspektief bied die bestuur van kennis vir innovasie.  
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Chapter 1 – Introduction and methodology 
 
1.1 Introduction  
Given the constant and rapid changes in the environment, it is commonly expected that for 
organisations to progress and improve they must constantly find new and efficient products.  
This is not only important for survival, but also a crucial source of competitive advantage 
especially about ideas and products that are not easy to replicate. That notwithstanding, the 
discovery of new products and services seldom occurs inadvertently. It results from deliberate 
cognitive efforts of individuals and teams who create, share, and develop knowledge through 
various processes.  
 
The discovery of new knowledge is only a means to an end. Firms must continuously and 
systematically develop and apply the found knowledge to an ever-increasing range of 
processes, some physical and others intangible (Boisot, 1998, p.2). Knowledge development is 
the basis of innovation, which is the basis of new products and thus a source of competitive 
advantage. It therefore follows that knowledge development, which is an element of broader 
knowledge management (KM), is the source of new products and thus a competitive advantage 
(Newell et al., 2009, p.233). 
 
Knowledge development is a collaborative process which in some instances occurs amongst 
competitors, regulators and the regulated. Through collaboration, partners share ideas, 
expertise, resources and bring together a broader set of complementary skills and talents. This 
results in a more responsive work culture, innovative thinking, and creativity which all augurs 
well for knowledge development (Cankar and Petkovsek, 2013, p.1597). Through 
collaboration knowledge development is fast-tracked and enriched, thereby yielding better and 
more efficient products and services (Cankar and Petkovsek, 2013, p.1597 and Newell et al. 
2009, p.92).  
 
The Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) which is a forum for 
democratic market economies that promotes economic growth and sustainable development, 
suggests that  
“throughout history, innovation has relied on collaboration among different economic 
actors – in particular among producers, who can see that the collective production of 
knowledge and innovation (associated today with advancing collaborative technology) 
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can sometimes yield a greater economic return than simple competition”. (OECD, 2004, 
p.22). 
 
Knowledge development, and innovation, are thus be considered as the “sole means of survival 
and prosperity in the globalised economies” (OECD, 2004, p.22). 
 
The collaborative nature of knowledge development and innovation must at times increasingly 
occur in a highly regulated environment wherein the innovator is required by regulations to 
submit their innovations to a regulator who must review and approve. In such scenarios, both 
innovation and regulation, consequently innovators and regulators are heavily dependent on 
knowledge, particularly its creation and diffusion. Essentially, innovation is embedded 
knowledge in case of products, and embodied knowledge in services.  
 
Innovators embark on extensive experimentation, research and development in their endeavour 
to create new products and services. This often takes years of conceptualisation, testing and 
retesting before presentation to the regulator for approval and permission to diffuse. Similarly, 
upon receipt of the new product or concept, the regulator must in each case analyse the product 
and authorise it individually after going through all stages of analysis (Taylor, Rubin & 
Hounshell, 2005, p.349). This also requires a significant amount of either tacit or explicit 
knowledge input from the regulator since it is expected that they too must conduct experiments, 
research and testing, albeit of a different kind.  
 
Therefore, at both sides of the innovation spectrum, knowledge development processes must 
be sound and alert to the requirements at any given point. This thesis explores these knowledge 
development variables for innovation, in the regulated gambling environment where the 
innovator is legally expected to collaborate with the regulator pre, and post-diffusion of 
gambling products through statutory submissions and approvals.  
1.2 Purpose and focus of the study  
Whilst innovation and regulation form a critical part of this thesis, it should be noted at the 
outset that this study is not about these concepts. As such, the salient debates of whether 
regulation is good for innovation, arguments for and against it, further definitions of such 
concepts or their need in society are not discussed extensively. From the understanding that the 
innovation scope of public regulators is confined to legislative prescripts and policy mandates, 
the focus here is not on innovation efforts of the regulators to improve regulatory processes but 
on their frequently unconscious and unquantified knowledge contribution towards the private 
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sectors’ products. Therefore, the interest of this thesis is biased towards the knowledge 
contribution aspect of public regulators into knowledge development for innovation.  
 
For purposes of this thesis, public regulators are regarded as those “government agencies that 
are responsible for the exercise of autonomous authority over specific areas of human activity 
in a regulatory or supervisory capacity”. These are agencies that “deal in the area of 
administrative law, regulation or rulemaking (codifying and enforcing rules and regulations 
and imposing supervision or oversight for the benefit of the public at large)”. Their existence 
is “justified by the complexity of certain regulatory and supervisory tasks that require 
expertise, the need for rapid implementation of public authority in certain sectors, and the 
drawbacks of political interference”. These agencies typically “perform investigations or 
audits, and others may fine the relevant parties and order certain measures” (Wikipedia, 
2016).  
 
The premise and context herein is based on private sector initiated products that are submitted 
to the public regulators, particularly in the regulated gambling industry in South Africa, for 
review and approval pre-diffusion for consumption by the intended market – post-diffusion. It 
has been noted that in the regulated gambling industry, the submission and review for approval 
of new products is a compulsory minimum legislative process that cannot be circumvented by 
the product owner (PO), nor by the regulator. This thus renders such an industry appropriate in 
highlighting the knowledge development for innovation dimension by the regulatory agencies 
concerned.  
 
Using a model product, i.e. EBTs, which are a form of gaming apparatus used in the Bingo 
sector, the study identifies and analyses the regulator’s processes and their impact on the model 
product using knowledge management theory espoused in Newell (2009) and aspects of 
Boisot’s (1998) I-space analogy. As an outcome, it is expected that the analysis will be crucial 
in explaining and describing the contribution of such institutions in innovations, evaluate 
existing practices, develop theory and point out implications for knowledge work where 
necessary. 
1.3 Research questions 
The study attempts to answer the following questions: 
 
i) What is the knowledge value of the public regulator in the gambling industry 
innovations and is it appropriately credited? 
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ii) How does the public regulator contribute to knowledge development for innovations 
(specifically in the regulated gambling industry)? 
 
iii) Is the regulator consciously structured and organised to support knowledge creation 
and knowledge work? 
1.4 Anticipated contribution 
Limited KM research regarding public sector organisations and public regulators in particular 
was identified. Although it is important and growing in statute and despite its information and 
knowledge intensity, as far as the author is aware, no KM research was conducted in the 
regulated South African gambling industry.  
 
The literature review in this thesis shows that the regulation-innovation phenomenon is best 
highlighted by industry and context specific empirical investigations and analysis. Therefore, 
this thesis builds on this approach by focusing on one industry i.e. regulated gambling, one 
regulator therein and particularly one product, which is the EBT.  
 
As such, it is anticipated that this research will not only contribute to the KM discourse in 
general but will unearth and highlight particular regulation-innovation related KM issues that 
are peculiar to the public sector and the gambling industry. From thereon, it is anticipated that 
this research may highlight regulation-innovation KM issues of the public sector and spur on 
further research in that direction. Research in this regard has been found to be inadequate. 
It is also anticipated that the research will be useful in policy issues around regulation and 
innovation by determining and highlighting the role of public institutions such as regulators in 
this process. By analysing innovation from the context of knowledge development in a 
regulatory environment, it is anticipated that the key contributors to such a process will be 
identifiable and result in the creation of particular programmes and support mechanisms.  
 
Furthermore, questions as to whether regulatory institutions are relevant and appropriately 
poised for knowledge development and innovation will hopefully be answered through the 
study. Finally, the study will hopefully highlight the knowledge development gaps, barriers 
and provide appropriate theoretical constructs to help minimise or eliminate these.  
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1.5 Qualitative research  
The aims and objectives of this thesis prompted the study towards a qualitative research 
approach. Using the regulated gambling industry as an example, in the main, the study was 
aimed at discovering and understanding the systems, perspectives and experiences of regulators 
and their licensees during innovation and knowledge creation. This was achieved using one 
such regulator in the Mpumalanga Province whereby the meaning and purpose of its actions 
were perused (Harwell, 2011, p.147). Therefore, the outcome herein is a matter of perspective 
and interpretation of the reality from the researchers’ perspective, thus cannot be the single and 
absolute truth. 
Since the research is a case study, extensive document reviews and interviews were conducted 
mainly to understand the case in context and to extract the relevant knowledge development 
practices gleaned from the available literature.  
1.6 Case study  
A case study is a “systematic inquiry into an event or a set of related events which aims to 
describe and explain the phenomenon of interest” (Zucker, 2009: p.3). Case studies are useful 
and appropriate in the study of exemplary and historical cases such as the handling of the EBT 
product by the regulator in this regard. This strategy was considered appropriate for the 
research of the knowledge creation and innovation phenomenon being considered in this 
regard. It provided the tools to study this complex phenomenon within its context using various 
data sources. Since the unit of analysis can vary from an individual to a corporation, this method 
was applied retrospectively but will most likely be used prospectively. As such, data came 
largely from documentation and interviews (Yin, 1994). 
This strategy was found to be highly appropriate because of “its flexibility and rigour” and 
valuable for the development of theory, evaluation of program and development of 
interventions (Baxter & Jack, 2008, p.554). 
1.7 Subject of analysis  
There were many products submitted for evaluation and approval to the Mpumalanga regulator 
(MGB) by companies in the industry. Also, there are many public regulators in the SA 
gambling industry. As such, to try and analyse all their cases would have been arduous and 
impractical, however, due to the vastly standardised systems used by regulators and the fact 
that they follow similar statutes, all products are subjected to similar processes. Although 
conducting multiple case studies is generally considered to provide more reliable and robust 
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results, in this regard such an approach would have been redundant.  Therefore, results based 
on the analysis of one of the evaluated regulators can to a certain extent be applied to others.  
Considering this, the study focused on the contribution of such regulators, particularly the 
Mpumalanga regulatory institution in the establishment and sustaining of a (then) new product 
referred to as EBT between 2008 and 2015. The EBT case was and is still a controversial 
polarising phenomenon, mainly because it did not to conform to orthodox regulatory practices 
and requirements. For these reasons amongst others, it was considered an exemplary case 
suitable for highlighting and responding to the KM questions of this research. 
The MGB, which is a juristic body that conforms to this thesis’ definition of a public regulator, 
will be used as a case study. The MGB is highly regarded in the industry as a competent and 
pioneering regulator. This institution held presidency of the International Association of 
Gaming Regulators (IAGR) in 2016 and occupied various key portfolios in such. IAGR is an 
organisation consisting of representatives from gaming regulatory organizations throughout the 
world. The MGB was selected firstly due to issues regarding access to pertinent data and 
personnel, and secondly, on having been at the forefront of the implementation of the EBT. 
The MGB was amongst the first regulators to be approached by EBT initiators for evaluation 
and approval of the product.  
This case study comprised of an empirical investigation of the knowledge development 
processes and the impact of the regulator contexts when it was first approached to evaluate the 
model product. To highlight the regulators’ contribution, the study evaluates the product’s 
salient characteristics, attributes and operational requirements pre and post-submission to the 
regulator. This effectively responds to research questions one and two, i.e. whether the 
regulator influenced the shape and form of the product and how it was done.  
1.8 Data collection approach 
1.8.1 Document reviews 
The regulatory process of introducing new products like the EBTs in a gambling market is 
regulated and involves multiple players. It is also technical and highly specialised. At a high 
level, national legislation and technical standards prescribe the requirements for new 
equipment. 
However, the provincial regulators prescribe and have discretion on the processes of 
introducing the product in the respective provinces. The technical standards, national and 
provincial legislation are a matter of public record and therefore can be accessed through 
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various platforms. Although the provincial legislation provides a high-level explanation of the 
processes to be followed, a more detailed account of the specific processes is exclusively 
contained in internal documents that are not published for public consumption.  
For this thesis, the MGB allowed the investigator access to the inspection manuals and 
operational procedures in the department directly responsible for new product evaluations and 
approvals. It was found that the submission and approval process is typically conducted 
through electronic mediums. However, in case of the EBT evaluation, manual processes were 
used since they allow more space for engagement between the relevant parties (MGB, 2007).  
Therefore, access was granted to the various correspondence between the regulator and the 
initiator of the product, as well as other submissions from external parties interested or affected 
by the introduction of the product. This mainly comprised of formal letters between and 
amongst the parties. The compendium of correspondence in this regard was useful in the 
understanding of the collaborative aspect of knowledge development about the product since 
it highlighted the various inputs from others from which the regulator’s position was gleaned.  
Access to the information about the product itself was needed and it was also obtained. This 
information contained test reports from the laboratories and the certification issued by the 
certifying authority (CA) issued for different variants of the EBT product. Such information 
was crucial in the understanding of the technical and administrative operations of the product 
which thus helped shape the conclusions on how the regulator contributed in developing 
knowledge that changed the product, or that aided its diffusion for consumption. 
Confidentiality and protection of the identities of the parties was common cause, hence the 
exact technical details of the product(s) and the initiator are not expressly mentioned in the 
study. 
Due to the public interest on the product, additional information concerning it was gleaned 
from media publications and court submissions, which was also crucial in highlighting the 
regulator’s contribution. Access to such information was not particularly an issue of constraint, 
instead the challenge was in narrowing it in terms of relevance to the study.  
Furthermore, the regulatory mandate and objectives of the regulator as indicated in their 
published documents, such as annual reports, brochures and website, were considered to 
determine the extent to which such support knowledge creation and to determine the impact of 
their posture on products such as the EBT product. Such records are also a matter of public 
record, however, permission to use such was also obtained.  
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1.8.2 Semi-structured interviews  
1.8.2.1 Selection criteria 
Whilst the documentation alone provided valuable empirical data highlighting the contribution 
of the regulator, this had to be augmented by oral accounts of people who were involved in the 
processes of developing knowledge for, and about the product before its diffusion for 
consumption. The interviewees’ experience in the pre-diffusion process was important in 
highlighting the tacit and, or explicit knowledge management principles applied during the 
evaluation of the product. Such people have been in constant interaction with other parties, 
such as fellow regulators and manufacturers of similar products within and outside of their 
jurisdiction. As such, this group was a rich resource of knowledge regarding the processes 
involved in the approval and diffusion of the product under consideration and other products 
in general.  
Further to the above criteria, the persons selected for the interview must have been involved in 
the process of rolling out the product after approval was granted by the regulator, as such, they 
possessed intimate technical knowledge of its functionality and features which was important 
in highlighting the differences in the product before and after approval. This allowed the 
contribution of the regulator to be easily identified and isolated from the original submission 
by the manufacturer. In the third instance, the persons identified for the interviews are involved 
in the continuous monitoring of the product to ensure continued compliance with regulatory 
requirements, post-diffusion. Accordingly, they are well placed to provide further 
recommendation regarding continuous improvement of the product albeit from a regulatory 
compliance rather than a commercial perspective. Therefore, the knowledge development and 
management input gleaned from this group in respect of the product is longitudinal and in a 
constant state of flux, hence a rich field of exploration for KM research.  
1.8.2.2 Sample size 
Within the model regulator used for the thesis, the number of people that met the above-
mentioned criteria are only six. Four of the six were at production level, i.e. Inspectors. These 
are the first line recipients and evaluators with technical expertise on gambling products such 
as the EBT under consideration in this thesis. The production worker is mainly responsible for 
the gathering of data and the monitoring of the gambling industry within the legislated 
parameters. This entails the planning of inspections such as identifying the areas of inspection, 
formulation of the scope, execution, and reporting on the inspection.  The production level 
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evaluators set the tone of the evaluation and highlighted the key issues that must be considered 
by the next level of evaluation i.e. the operations managers.  
There were two operations managers interviewed, and they in the main evaluate the work of 
the production workers and provide guidance in that regard. In total three of the six employees 
meeting the criteria were interviewed. These three interviewees constituted 50% of the people 
meeting the selection criteria and also representative of the two pertinent levels of evaluation 
of gambling products like the EBT.  
1.8.2.3 Respondent’s profiles 
 
The two operations managers were directly involved in the processes evaluating the EBT and 
are currently responsible for ensuring continued compliance of the product as it operates. These 
managers have combined experience of over 30 years in the gambling industry and possess 
tertiary levels of education.  
The other respondent has over 20 years of experience in gambling regulation and overall 
experience in the gambling industry of 30 years. His career started in the operational side from 
a casino perspective. This respondent is a production worker with the official designation of an 
inspector, thus responsible for the continued inspections and knowledge generation about 
gambling products.  
Table 1: Respondents’ profiles 
Subject Position Role  Education 
level 
Experience Field of 
expertise 
Current 
studies 
Interview 
date 
Respondent 
1 
Operations 
Manager 
Management Tertiary +10 years Technical Yes. 16/11/2016 
Respondent 
2 
Operations 
Manager 
Management Tertiary +20 years Law 
enforcement 
None. 22/11/2016 
Respondent 
3 
Inspector Production  Tertiary +30 years Gaming 
Systems 
None. 30/08/2017 
Source: Personal collection  
1.8.2.4 Interview guide 
The interview guide was formulated to determine mainly three broad knowledge management 
requirements.  
Inspired by Newell et al.’s (2009) proposition that an organisations activities must be 
characterised by an emphasis on theoretical knowledge, creativity and the use of analytical and 
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social skills; the interview guide firstly aimed at understanding the state of knowledge work 
and the knowledge worker in the organisation. Accordingly, basic background questions such 
as education, experience, position occupied, and types of training required for the position were 
administered. Furthermore, issues of autonomy, specialisation and esoteric skills were probed 
to understand the nature of knowledge work in the organisation.  
Secondly, questions around the requirements for knowledge work were probed. In this regard, 
the interview guide required the respondent to describe their work in detail with a view to 
determine as an outcome, the extent of knowledge development through activities such as 
experiments and tests. Specific questions about project work, knowledge creation, 
collaboration and sharing of knowledge. The guidelines also sought the interviewees opinions 
and assessment in regard to what they viewed as a contribution of the regulator into the EBT 
product during and post their evaluation. 
Conducting interviews with persons with intimate knowledge about the product enhanced the 
study. In the first instance, it provided an understanding of the context within which the 
evaluation and subsequently the approval occurred. The literature review revealed and 
highlighted the importance of context and specificity in studies of this nature. Documents alone 
cannot fully reveal a context hence they must be augmented by the oral accounts of the persons 
involved. The interviews, therefore, provided such an oral account.  
Secondly, the interviews highlighted the level of expertise and subject knowledge of pertinent 
employees of the regulator. This was particularly important to test the theoretical propositions 
that regulators are often ill equipped, incompetent and unequal to the knowledge development 
for innovation challenge often posed by the innovating firms in the private sectors. The 
discussions varied somewhat from person to person depending on their answers. 
However, in the main the personal attributes of the respondent such as experience in the field, 
educational levels, current and further studies, product knowledge and understanding of 
knowledge processes were consistent features in all the interviews. This was mainly to test the 
knowledge work and worker aspects of their jobs and of the organisations’ employees 
themselves to determine consistency with knowledge management theory espoused in 
theoretical literature, particularly Newell et al. (2009).  
Lastly, the interviews provided an important window into the employee’s perceptions about 
the organisation’s posture towards knowledge development and the innovations from its 
private sector licensees. This was also particularly useful in the formulation of the conclusions 
in this respect.  
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1.8.2.5 Interview process 
Interviews were conducted in English, and individually at the respondents’ offices after the 
necessary permission was obtained. These were recorded on audio, whilst key points of 
discussion were noted on the interview guide (Appendix 1). The first interview was conducted 
on 16 November 2016, with one of the two operations managers (Respondent 1); the second 
one was on the 22 November 2016 with the other operations manager (Respondent 2). The last 
interview i.e. with the production worker (Respondent 3) was conducted on 30 August 2017.  
During the interviews, similar questions were put to the respondents as per the interview guide, 
but this was not conducted in a particular format. As such, not all the questions as per the 
interview guideline were directly asked by the investigator. In certain instances, the 
respondents provided responses that covered other aspects of knowledge work and its 
management. That notwithstanding, the questions followed a certain structure and contained 
knowledge management themes, such as the extent to which the respondent thought of 
themselves as knowledge workers. This was in order to determine if the regulator, through its 
employees positioned itself as a knowledge intensive firm so as to make a knowledge 
contribution to products submitted to it for approval, such as the EBT.  
To probe the knowledge intensity question further, the level of education, further study, current 
position, the details of what this position entails and the type of training required to occupy 
such were discussed with the all the respondents. Further to the knowledge intensity 
considerations, the processes of the regulator and the respondent’s role, in particular the 
consideration for approval of new products, were considered. Therefore, direct questions about 
testing and experimentation of the product were asked. Specific to the EBTs, questions were 
asked about the extent of collaboration, project management, knowledge creation and the 
respondents’ direct view about how the regulator contributed to the diffusion of the product. 
1.9 Data analysis 
The data analysis framework was gleaned Boisot’s (1998) theoretical propositions, particularly 
the I-space concept. The choice of Boisot’s propositions was inspired by the similarities that 
were illuminated by the empirical findings on how the EBT product came to existence, 
particularly the creation and development of knowledge emanating therefrom. Boisot’s 
submissions about embedded knowledge and the use of existing knowledge assets in people’s 
heads, documents, and then translating them into artefacts also seemed particularly germane to 
the knowledge development of the EBT and by all collaborators. The I-space was particularly 
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relevant since it highlighted poignantly the contribution of the regulator in the final diffusion 
aspect of the EBT product.  
The Schumpeter theoretical constructs seemed to support the view of innovations being based 
on previous versions of a product that are thus built upon. Accordingly, the evolution of the 
EBT over the years from traditional Bingo games seemed to bear many similarities with 
Schumpeter’s theory of learning. Accordingly, the Schumpeterian analysis was brought in to 
support the views proffered by Boisot (1998), as well as to highlight the consistency of this 
theory with the knowledge creation and development aspects identified in the process of 
evaluating and approving the EBTs by the regulator.  
The audio recordings from the interviews, were replayed during the analysis process. These 
responses were noted in line with the questions and discussion points contained in the interview 
guide. There are instances where the respondents provided more information than what was 
requested, and such information was also recorded and used in the analysis of the regulator’s 
organisational context against KM principles.   
1.10 Limitations of the study  
The EBT case in point clearly involves several stakeholders who played distinct roles. The 
perspective presented herein is from one the role-players i.e. the regulator. This is appropriate 
since the study focused on the role of the regulator in this regard. However, within the 
regulator’s processes certain decisions and responses were influenced by other parties, 
particularly the manufacturer. The study would have been greatly enriched if the perspective 
of the manufacturer was also explored in the context of the regulator’s response to their actions.  
For example, reading from the legislative requirements, it would appear as though the 
codification scheme of the equipment was forthright, hence the manufacture could have known 
the correct and applicable codification parameters. Aside from the manufacturer, there are 
many other parties with interest in the diffusion of the product whose views are not captured 
in this thesis. This question is not answered in this thesis due to the limitations of the scope.  
Secondly, the product was introduced first in 2008 which is approximately eight years up to 
when this thesis is conducted. Therefore, some documents which are pertinent in answering 
the questions are no longer in the active domain or have been disposed due to the lapsed time. 
Furthermore, pertinent personnel who were involved in the submission, evaluation and 
eventually approval of the product were no longer available or employed by the manufacturer 
or by the regulator. For example, the line managers at the manufacturer and at the regulator 
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who sanctioned the submission of the product for evaluation, respectively. Therefore, their 
input particularly on the contextual background was not accessible hence beyond the scope of 
my contribution.  
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Chapter 2: The role of regulation and regulators in knowledge 
development for innovation – a literature review 
2.1 Introduction  
 
It has been submitted thus far that knowledge development for innovation requires, and thrives 
in a collaborative environment. However, collaborative environments free of regulations are 
almost non-existent and regulation is now pervasive and unavoidable (Shleifer, 2005, p.439); 
hence it is a key feature in product innovation, and the development of knowledge thereof. In 
this chapter, the thesis examines the role of the regulation phenomenon in knowledge 
development for innovation by reviewing existing literature related to the concepts of 
regulation, innovation, and knowledge. Theoretical constructs of these concepts and their 
definitions are proffered to lay the theoretical foundations about whether knowledge 
development for innovation thrives, or suffers in a regulated environment. The arguments 
presented by the Porter Hypothesis (1991) and CET are introduced herein to support or reject 
regulation as a catalyst in knowledge development for innovation.  
2.2 Theoretical overview of regulation, innovation, and knowledge  
 
2.2.1 Regulation 
As a generic concept, regulation refers to the exercise of control, and, or intervention by 
government over the behaviour, or on the structure of firms in a market. Regulatory 
interventions are mainly on key variables like prices, outputs, advertising, profits and 
information. The structural interventions focus on the prohibition of mergers and acquisitions 
intended to thwart competition and aim to prevent anticompetitive market practices (Schiller, 
2008, p. 547). Government regulation that covers both structure and behaviour is achieved 
through antitrust laws which are laws that are essentially aimed at directly changing market 
outcomes by imposing specific limitations on prices, outputs or investment decisions. 
 
In an ideal market, all producers are “perfect competitors”, consumers have full information 
about costs, prices, and the effects and benefits of the products they purchase and consume. In 
such an instance regulation is deemed unnecessary, hence a laissez faire approach. However, 
markets sometimes fail. For instance, in unregulated markets producers may produce the wrong 
mix of outputs, use undesirable methods of production, or unfairly distribute income. For such 
reasons, government thus intervenes through regulation. However, government intervention 
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through regulation can also fail due to inefficiencies and compliance burdens which plunge the 
industry into an undesirable state. Sometimes, it is argued, a worse state prior to the government 
intervention prevails (Schiller, 2008, p. 547).  
On the other side of government intervention through regulation is the argument for 
deregulation. The deregulation proposition rests on the observation that government 
intervention through regulation sometimes worsens market outcomes and that the failure of the 
markets by themselves is lesser than the government failures – i.e. government intervention 
that fails to impose economic outcomes (Schiller, 2008, p. 555).  
Questions therefore arise as to when to regulate an industry and what is the proper form of 
regulation. Likewise, when is it the appropriate time to deregulate an industry. Despite these 
considerations, it is clear that both the markets and the government interventions are imperfect. 
Regulation therefore presents the difficult but necessary considerations and choices between 
the imperfect markets and the imperfect government interventions.  
2.2.2 Innovation  
Innovation is an expansive multifaceted concept which has been discussed and defined in 
widely available studies and literature. Its processes include identifying a problem or 
opportunity, developing new ideas, diffusion of the ideas and implementation of the solution 
(Newell, 2009, p.188 & Cankar and Petkovsek, 2013, p.1597). All these are knowledge 
intensive endeavours. Cankar and Petkovsek (2013, p.1597) sums innovation as the creation of 
better products, services, processes and technologies, hence, it is a result of a complex use of 
ideas. Ideas which are a factor of knowledge and its processes. 
 
In broad terms, innovations are classified into products and processes respectively termed 
technical, and administrative (Newell et al., 2009, p.189). The first kind results in tangible 
products whilst the latter results in a change in production processes. They also vary in degree 
with some resulting in revolutionary changes, thus aptly termed radical, whilst others may 
result in evolutionary type of changes (Ashford & Heaton, 1983).   
 
Innovation comes in many different forms, sometimes as a circumvention of compliance 
requirements imposed by regulators, at times as improvements to existing products or as 
completely new products or services (Stewart, 2010). There are many and varying definitions 
of innovation, most of which refer to the generation (invention), spread (diffusion) and 
application (implementation) of ideas in practice (Newell et al., 2009, p.169). Some definitions 
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such as Schumpeter (1942) extend the requirements for innovation beyond invention and 
diffusion to require the successful commercial application of an idea. The Schumpeterian view 
finds resonance in Cankar & Petkovsek (2013, p.1598) who also emphasise that the idea must 
be accepted by government and society to be considered as innovation. As Jaffe et al. (2002, 
p.43) states, innovation can also occur without invention when an idea that was never 
commercialised is brought to the market.   
 
Notwithstanding any of the definitions, a key component of innovation is knowledge creation 
(Newell et al., 2009, p.234). Therefore, the form in which it comes is of little importance and 
perhaps no consequence. The reality of the knowledge and globalised economy is that 
companies and societies are required to spend more time and resources producing new ideas to 
align and even anticipate changes in the environment (OECD, 2004). That notwithstanding, 
innovation discussions are at a higher level with little to no emphasis on it as a product of 
knowledge and its processes. For such reasons, the input and contribution of other 
collaborators, explicit or tacit, formal or informal, and deliberate or unintended, is often not 
recorded, recognised and credited.   
2.2.3 Knowledge  
The definition of knowledge is somewhat controversial but the epistemologies of possession 
and practice have largely stood out. Proponents of the epistemology of possession regard 
knowledge as the property of the knower, which in the same way as any other possession that 
can be transferred, developed and applied. From the perspective of possession, knowledge is 
presented in a form of a pyramid (Figure 1) comprised of data which is articulated to 
information, to knowledge and wisdom at its peak. Data is regarded as an independent entity 
which exists out there without any meaning, whereas information refers to data that has been 
organised. The epistemology of possession posits that knowledge is the personal possession of 
the knower, who then confers meaning to information and data by drawing from their frame of 
reference (Newell et al., 2009, p.14). 
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Figure 1: Knowledge Pyramid 
Source: Newell et al. (2009, p.3) 
 
On the other hand, the epistemology of practice holds the view that knowledge results from 
social interactions wherein tacit knowledge is converted to explicit knowledge which is then 
transferred from one person to another and thus related to the knowledge of a wider community. 
The knowledge as practice epistemology further posits that knowledge can be observed through 
the practices of a group or individuals which are inextricably bound up in the way these groups 
or individuals develop shared identities and beliefs (Newell et al., 2009, p.4). There have been 
several attempts to reconcile these definitions, e.g. Cook & Brown, (1999) as cited in Newell 
et al. (2009, p.16) who opined that knowledge is used by both individuals and groups either 
explicitly or tacitly in all their activities. Cook & Brown (1999) saw knowledge and knowing 
as mutually enabling processes.  
 
Other contributors to the subject of knowledge such as Newell et al. (2009), see knowledge as 
the ability to discriminate within and across contexts. Whilst Tsoukas & Vladimirou (2001) 
also cited in Newell et al. (2009) hold that context and theory are both important. Therefore, in 
the context of organisations; knowledge is regarded as the shared norms, understandings and 
practices that integrates actors and artefacts to produce desired outcomes. The common thread 
emerging from these definitions of knowledge is that it is a dynamic phenomenon with many 
dimensions and a property of memory and not data. Accordingly, it is expressed in embedded 
and codified forms, signified in one’s capacity to act intelligently (embodied), delegated to 
automata and recordings (codified) (Kinghorn, 2014).   
Wisdom
Knowledge
Information
Data
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2.2.3.1 Knowledge processes and types of knowledge  
Using Nonaka’s widely accepted and quoted SECI model, knowledge creation processes are 
largely identified as socialisation, externalisation, combination and internalisation (Newell at 
al., 2009, p.8). Fundamentally, the SECI model defines a cyclical process of interactions and 
conversion of knowledge between explicit and tacit knowledge. On the basis that organisational 
knowledge begins with the individual, the socialisation aspect of the SECI model occurs during 
interactions between individuals. In this regard, tacit-tacit knowledge conversions occur and 
will remain undiscernible until externalisation which is about tacit-explicit knowledge 
conversions occurs. Other processes like internalisation and combination refer to explicit-tacit 
and explicit-explicit knowledge conversions.  
 
That notwithstanding, the SECI model does not necessarily suggest that knowledge creation 
only occurs at the individual level, but recognises the role of other stakeholder such as 
organisations and their managers. Nonaka emphasises the importance of the establishment of 
a context that enables knowledge creation within organisations. Nonaka & Komo (1998), as 
cited in Newell et al. (2009, p.8), define context as the “shared space for emerging 
relationships” and such space can be physical, virtual, mental or a combination of all these 
dimensions. Furthermore, Newell et al. (2009) argue that knowledge is embedded in the context 
where it is acquired through individual experiences. As such, the knowledge processes of 
socialisation, externalisation, internalisation and combination occur in the contexts of 
originating, interacting, cyber and exercising.   
 
Though popular and widely accepted, Nonaka’s SECI model is criticised for presenting an 
overly individualised perspective of knowledge amongst many of its highlighted shortcomings. 
As such, alternative knowledge models such as Spender, (1996) & (1998) frameworks also 
offer proposals for knowledge creation. Whilst Nonaka’s SECI model is premised on the 
conversions between tacit and explicit knowledge, Spender’s framework is further concerned 
about where the knowledge resides. As such, Spender (1996) & (1998) also distinguishes 
between individual and collective knowledge over and above explicit and tacit considerations.  
 
Another prominent knowledge framework besides Nonaka’s and Spender’s is Blackler’s 
(1995) framework which essentially depicts knowledge as embrained, embodied, encultured, 
embedded and encoded. Blackler (1995, pp. 1024-1025) describes embrained knowledge as 
knowledge that is dependent on conceptual skills and cognitive abilities, whilst embodied refers 
to action oriented knowledge. Encultured knowledge refers to organisations’ shared 
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understandings, embedded refers to systemic routines and encoded is information conveyed 
through signs and symbols. 
2.2.3.2 Distinguishing knowledge from data, and information  
Knowledge should not be confused with data and information; however, these constructs are 
important in its creation. Whilst the epistemology of possession expresses knowledge as a 
consequence of data and information, such an analysis is partially correct and appropriate in 
explaining the workings of computers. Nevertheless, as a definition of knowledge in general 
this materialists’ definition is incorrect (Kinghorn, 2014). There are significant differences in 
the concepts of data, information and knowledge and these have been conflated and purported 
to explain the concept of knowledge. 
Data is a concept that became frequently used in the advent of quantitative analysis and 
emphasis on it dramatically increased as a key concept in the era of computation. This notion 
bears multiple meanings depending on the context in which it is used. It should be noted that 
data does not necessarily mean facts and necessarily neutral but, just like information and 
knowledge, it is the construct of the human brain. Information, on the other hand, is inherently 
a communications concept produced for a limited time-span, and once it has been consumed, 
it ceases to be information. Whilst it has the potential to support knowledge, it can only succeed 
if it conveys meaning (Kinghorn, 2014). 
The framework of knowledge economics as used by Boisot (1998, p.21) provides an 
appropriate analysis of the concepts of data, information and knowledge particularly in the 
context of organisations’ quest for competitive advantage. Accordingly, Boisot explores the 
role of data, information and knowledge in the factors of production such as labour and capital. 
He explores these from Agrarian, industrial (Neoclassical) and knowledge based economies 
(evolutionary). The central theme in Boisot’s notion, as also is the case with economics, is the 
concept of scarcity particularly of the physical factors of production such as labour and land. 
Given the constraint of scarce resources, it thus becomes important to ensure a cautious use of 
resources such that output always exceeds input.  
Agrarian economies in the 19th century relied heavily on nature, human and animal energy 
(Boisot, 1998, p.21). It was only during the 20th century when capital in the form of machinery 
and other forms of production product introduced. The problem with energy based production 
is the concept of locality, therefore, the introduction of capital reduced the use of human and 
animal energy in the production process which was the pillar of the century in Agrarian 
economies. This made production easier, more accurate, predictable, and efficient. However, 
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in order to function, the factors of production required all embodied notions of data, 
information and knowledge.  
2.2.3.3 Uses of data, information, and knowledge 
The role of data in this regard as Boisot (1998) sees it, is to discriminate and illuminate physical 
states of things. Therefore, data states what the things are, hence it nuances what they are not, 
for example, the colour, size and quantity. On their own, these descriptions of objects have no 
informational value or meaning. Information is derived from the data by an agent depending 
on the agent’s prior knowledge which can include memory and experience. The agent therefore 
attaches meaning to data, which can thus be termed as information (Weick, 1995, p.5). 
Knowledge on the other hand is the economising of the information derived from data to ensure 
savings in the use of space, time and energy. The economising is done by embedding the data 
sources into physical artefacts thereby modifying their data structures and information bearing 
capacity.  
Knowledge organises the physical resources by embedding them in information documents and 
systems. It is worth noting, however, that knowledge cannot be directly observed but can only 
be inferred through the actions of the agents (Boisot, 1998, pp.12-13). Boisot’s hypothesis 
regarding knowledge indicates fundamental differences in the outcome of exploitation 
processes of knowledge in the neoclassical and the evolutionary production regimen.  
In the neoclassical sense, Boisot argues that new knowledge in some cases results in an 
increased consumption of physical resources to save data-processing resources. However, in 
the current evolutionary production function, more data resources are used over physical 
resources such as labour and land. Therefore, an inverse relationship exists between physical 
resources (e.g. labour) and data resources (capital), such that the more data is accumulated on 
a system the less use of physical resources becomes necessary (Boisot, 1998, p.31).  
2.2.3.4 Neoclassical (N), and Schumpeterian (S) Learning  
Boisot’s theory of learning hinges on the information space (I-space), which is a conceptual 
framework that explores the relationship between codification, abstraction and diffusion of 
knowledge Boisot (1998, p.58). Since data and information have become factors of production 
in the new knowledge economy, they have and continue to substitute physical factors of 
production such as labour through learning processes that increase the data and information 
consumption, processing and economising. In recognition of the important role of data and 
information in the evolutionary economy, firms invest in the creation of knowledge to secure 
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competitive advantage. The result of such investments is the generation of copious amounts of 
non-homogenous knowledge which yield little value to the firm unless it is adequately codified, 
abstracted, and diffused. 
Codification is about partitioning the data into perceptual and conceptual categories. This can 
result into too many categories of data being created rendering the data ineffectual, especially 
if the phenomenon being codified is complex (Boisot, 1998, pp.42-45). The limitations of 
codification are compensated by the process of abstraction which gives broad structures to the 
data, thus minimising the number of categories. The latter part of the process is diffusion which 
is about dissemination and broadcast for wider consumption and use until it becomes common 
sense. Boisot’s hypothesis also proffers that the data trajectory in the I-space is not always 
unidirectional towards greater codification, abstraction, and diffusion, it can also travel in the 
opposite direction (Boisot, 1998, p.58). The concepts of N-learning and S-learning illuminate 
and differentiate between the two trajectories of data in the I-space. 
 
Figure 2: The I-space 
Source: Boisot (1998) 
2.2.3.5 Neoclassical(N) learning  
Using the concept of N-learning, the I-space hypothesis attempts to describe a learning process 
wherein knowledge that has been accumulated over time is a more accurate representation of 
a phenomenon. This knowledge is held in such high regard since over the cause of its 
generation, incorrect knowledge and errors were identified and gradually weeded out. The 
knowledge acquired through the N-learning process is gradually disseminated to the population 
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and in the process, it replaces faulty knowledge. However, knowledge acquired through N-
learning reaches a point of inertia which could mean that a high level of reliance can be placed 
on it since it provides a solid base of robustness and trustworthiness. 
On the contrary, the state of inertia could mean that any foundational errors committed in the 
creation of such knowledge are entrenched and so inherent in the knowledge that it will be 
difficult to disentangle. The continued economic value of knowledge acquired in the N-learning 
regime relies on its prolonged stay in the codification and abstraction sphere of the I-space. 
Delaying the progression of the knowledge to the diffusion stage of the I-space is in the firms’ 
best interest since rapidly defusing the knowledge eliminates scarcity thus minimising any 
potential benefits that the firm might realise (Boisot, 1998, pp.96-98).  
2.2.3.6 Schumpeterian (S) learning  
The notion of S-learning is premised on the hypothesis that the world is non-linear, therefore 
solutions on how phenomena are handled are also non-linear and inherently riddled with errors. 
Consequently, no amount of codifying, abstraction and diffusion of data can eliminate all the 
errors in our understanding of phenomena. As such, prior acts of codification, abstraction and 
diffusion are always hypotheses about the world or phenomena hence subject to review. S-
learning moves data along Boisot’s I-space in a continuous and infinite cyclical motion, thus 
constantly creating new knowledge which destroys existing practices. Contrary to N-learning, 
which derives greater value by remaining in the coded and abstract spheres of the I-space or 
region C of the Social Learning Cycle (SLC), S-learning does not reach the state of inertia 
(Boisot, 1998, p. 59). 
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Figure 3: The Social Learning Cycle 
Source: Boisot (1998) 
Once diffused to the population, agents subject the knowledge to their own subjective 
interpretative schemes which vary according to their experiences. The agents’ experiences 
either confirm or challenge the codes and abstract structures employed in the knowledge. If the 
codes confirm their existing schemes, the knowledge may be accepted and retained, however, 
if they contradict the agents’ schemes they are most likely to be modified until they conform 
(Boisot, 1998, pp.99-103).  
S-learning is tantamount to innovation, perpetual knowledge creation and the attainment of 
competitive advantage on a continuous basis, hence a prominent feature of the knowledge 
economy. 
2.3 Knowledge creation, and the knowledge creating firm  
Knowledge creation is according to Newell et al. (2009, p. 233) one of four knowledge 
development processes. It is undertaken for the purpose of forming new ideas, processes, 
services or products and often results in innovation. The other three knowledge development 
processes are sharing, codifying and integration.  
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Similar to innovation, knowledge creation involves many different processes such as 
experimentation, discussions and research through teamwork or projects (Newell et al. 2009, 
p.234). Although there are many knowledge creation approaches, “formal research remains a 
cornerstone for knowledge production in many sectors, mainly due to its ability to provide a 
sheltered domain for carrying experiments which are not viable in real life” (OECD, 2004,22). 
However, the advent of information and communication technologies (ICT) has opened many 
new possibilities for knowledge production and development such as online learning which 
allows individuals to learn by doing and assess their skills.  
 
Depending on the strategic significance of knowledge to the firm, specific knowledge processes 
are preferred and an environment that allows such to thrive is created. In broad terms, 
companies seek to explore, exploit, or combine both in their knowledge management approach. 
Typically, knowledge exploring firms rely mainly on the creation and integration of new 
knowledge and the knowledge developed by expert workers over time. The outcomes herein 
are often intangible knowledge based products emanating from loosely defined problem based 
team designs. 
 
Firms inclined to mostly engage in knowledge creation activities are often small and 
entrepreneurially driven with an inclination towards radical innovation rather than incremental 
ones (Newell et al., 2009, p.232). On the contrary, knowledge exploiting firms are mainly 
interested in improving efficiency and identifying new markets. This is mainly because these 
firms are often well established and offer recognised services to a captive market. Typically, 
these include public regulators who are creatures of statutes and not driven by competition and 
market forces like their counterparts in the private sector.  
 
Cankar & Petkovsek (2013, p.1597) classify drivers of knowledge creation and innovation into 
internal and external factors. Internally these include the organisation’s innovation strategy, 
culture, size, educational level and skills of staff, the type of resources processed and 
management’s attitude towards innovation. External factors on the other hand, include the 
prevailing economic conditions, legislation, market growth of the applicable industry, input 
prices and links with academic and research institutions. In light of the innovation factors, 
organisations must first improve their internal processes, qualifications of their employees and 
develop suitable technical infrastructures for sophisticated products. 
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Usually, knowledge creation inclined firms were typically in the private sector. However, this 
is no longer the case since the public sector has seemingly begun to embrace innovation to 
improve its performance (Cankar & Petkovsek, (2013, p.1603). 
2.4 Public, private sector knowledge development and innovation 
Most KM research has been carried out in the private sector with limited focus on the public 
sector. KM research on public regulators is even harder to find. Even the works of early KM 
pioneers such as Nonaka (1991), Nonaka & Takeuchi (1995), Szulanski (1996), Wiig, (1993) 
and much later, Armistead & Meakins (2002) and Newell et. al. (2009), are based in private 
sector contexts. Nonaka’s flagship work is based on private sector companies in Japan such as 
Honda and Canon amongst others, whilst Armistead & Meakings’ (2002) work is based on 
interviews conducted with managers in private industrial companies.  
 
As expected, the KM examples, recommendations and theories are premised in the private 
sector context. Tacitly, this implies that public sector organisations must emulate knowledge 
management practices that have proved successful and entrenched in the private sector. 
However, this tendency is not unique to the KM discipline. Throughout history, the public 
sector always adopted management practices that have already gained recognition and 
acceptance in the private sector (Cong & Pandya, 2003, pp. 25-31).  
 
Examples in this regard include blockbuster management practices such as enterprise resources 
planning (ERP), business process re-engineering (BPR), total quality management (TQM), 
lean production and just in time (JIT). Since it has passed the “fad” stage and accepted as a 
proper management practice, KM is one of the latest of management practices to be adopted 
by the public sector (Cong & Pandya, 2003, p.25).  
 
Although many of these practices were initially piloted in the private sector, they were found 
equally applicable to the public sector. However, there are significant differences between the 
private and public sector which could determine the success or failure of a KM intervention. 
Most notable of such is that, firms in the private sector are dependant and answerable to their 
‘shareholders’ whilst the public-sector accounts to stakeholders (Cong & Pandya, 2003, p.28). 
As such, stakeholders and shareholders must be managed differently due to their differing 
interests. In comparison, shareholders are mainly interested in returns on investment and thrive 
on competition, whilst stakeholders are more concerned about issues of policy making, service 
delivery and provisioning of information.  
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Considering these distinctions, different approaches to KM must be applied. Therefore, the KM 
practices with origins from the private sector inevitably require adaptation to the contextual 
prescripts of the public sector. The same applies to the private sector in case of KM or any 
other discoveries made in the public sector. In the case of the public sector, adopting KM 
practices that are already entrenched in the private sector presents a significant disadvantage in 
that, it always remains at least several steps behind the private sector in terms new knowledge 
assets. These disadvantages are further compounded in the case of public regulators who are 
often required to evaluate, adjudicate and monitor knowledge assets for which they may not be 
ready. Hence, the stereotypes that public institutions in general and regulators in particular are 
incompetent are perpetuated. 
 
On the other side of this, the diffusion of new knowledge assets or processes may be delayed 
unnecessarily due to the public regulators being unfamiliar with the products being presented 
by the private sector licensees, thereby slowing the diffusion process and frustrating the latter’s 
ambitions. For these reasons, the disproportionate research between private and public sector 
specific KM practices in favour of the former can be a significant constraint to fully embracing 
and exploiting the benefits of the knowledge economy.  
2.5 Knowledge development, and products pending approval 
 
The processes of knowledge development as per Newell et al. (2009) involves, testing, research 
and experimentation whereby tacit and explicit knowledge are applied in projects and teams. 
Knowledge development in firms mainly depends on its workers, their qualifications and 
attitudes. But to a greater degree it also depends on outside factors comprised of other firms, 
the availability of infrastructure, educational institutions, and regulatory agencies amongst 
many others (OECD; 2000, p.163). The interdependence aspect of knowledge development 
and innovation in firms receives support from many authors on the subject such as 
(Freeman,1987; Lundvall, 1992 & Nelson, 1993) who all note that knowledge creation and 
development, thus innovation do not occur in isolation but within a system comprised of 
relationships, and networks. Therefore, the process will inevitably be multi-faceted and multi-
directional with many inputs and feedback loops.  
Although knowledge creation and development often relies on experimentation, testing and 
research (Newell, 2009, pp.189 & 234), this does not necessarily mean greenfield scientific 
R&D. Advances in sciences “take too long to have an impact on innovation”, hence new 
innovations often do not involve new research “but a particular application of a known 
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
27 
scientific discovery or technical development, or a substantial improvement of an existing 
product or process” (Nelson & Rosenberg, 1993). 
2.6 The relationship of regulation and innovation  
The relationship of regulation – therefore that of the regulators, and innovation – hence 
knowledge creation and development, is complex and has been to date not been unequivocally 
defined. There are strong and valid views supporting regulation as a conduit for innovation. 
Similarly, there are equally strong views lamenting regulation as an inhibitor for knowledge 
development for innovation. In the main, the studies of the relationship between these variables 
have been biased towards exploring the impact of regulation on innovation, however, not much 
has been done to assess how innovation affects regulation.  
Glaeser & Sheifler, (2003, p.401) note that regulation as a system of managing market and firm 
behaviour gained prominence between 1887 and 1917. At the time, it was viewed as an 
alternative to private litigation which was the main method of regulating behaviour and 
resolving disputes. Before the 1900’s, it was common for courts to rule on issues such as anti-
competitive behaviour, safety of food and drugs, prices and antitrust policies. These issues now 
pervasively fall under the scope of regulation and regulators (Glaeser & Sheifler, 2003, p.401).  
Regulation mainly re-established itself as an important focus of socio-legal research in the early 
1980’s when several studies were conducted on regulatory enforcement. Such studies are 
believed to have been spurred by the inadequacies of the then pervasive traditional command-
and-control approaches to regulation. Therefore, subsequent studies considered various other 
aspects to it, such as the economic and political conditions under which compliance with 
regulatory requirements can be achieved (Haines, 1997, p.269).  
Prominent in the study of the relationship between innovation and regulation, thus the 
relationship of innovators and regulators, are CET theoretical analyses and the Porter 
Hypothesis. In broad terms, CET theory views regulation as an impediment to regulation 
mainly due to various inefficiencies attributed to the practice (Schiller, 2008, pp.555 – 598). 
Whereas the Porter Hypothesis stands in sharp contrast to the views espoused in CET and 
largely posits that regulation, if applied correctly and under favourable circumstances – in fact, 
induces innovation rather than stifle it, as argued by economic theory (Stewart, 2010, p.8; 
Ashford and Hall, 2011, p.270 - 289). Whilst several types and methods of innovation are 
advanced henceforth, they mainly subscribe to either the CET analysis of the relationship, or 
the Porter school of thought.  
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There is a pervasive view that regulation around the world is ubiquitously on the rise due to 
the failure or inefficiencies of judges and traditional court systems. Andrei Shleifer and others 
(2003; 2005;2007 & 2012), through various collaborative works, has attempted to explain the 
supposed rise of regulation with both empirical and historical evidence (see, Shleifer, 2012, 
p.343; Glaeser & Shleifer, 2003; Mulligan & Shleifer, 2005, and Gennaioli & Shleifer, 2007). 
Henceforth, deregulation through its various forms, such as the reduction of bureaucracy 
associated with implementing a particular policy or the removal of specific restrictions, has 
become an important political and policy consideration (Menez, 2013, p.578).  
In reviewing the available literature on the relationship between knowledge development, 
creation and hence innovation, the extent of the complexity of the relationship is unveiled. The 
complexity hereof stems from the diversity of the regulations, the industries being regulated, 
and the types of innovation. Therefore, in examining it scholarly work has tended to be case, 
industry specific, and examined in detail focused and specified regulatory-innovation issues 
affecting the targeted industry (Davies, 1983, pp. 42-43). As such, the studies tend to yield 
bespoke findings and conclusions, but do not provide an abstractive consensus on whether 
regulation inspires, or smothers innovation.   
Stewart (2010, p. 1) in his cross-industry literature review of the impact of regulation on 
innovation, traces the debate on regulation and innovation in the United States to the early 
1960s in the context of the “decline of economic regulation and the rise in social welfare 
regulation”. He notes that the gradual abandoning of economic regulation in favour of social 
welfare regulation was fuelled mainly by CET theory which views regulation as a significant 
cost burden on firms that saps resources from the firms’ investments on innovation. Stewart 
(2010, p.1) relied on Joseph Schumpeter’s (1942) definition of innovation which distinguished 
innovation as “a commercially successful application of an idea – from invention, idea 
development, and from diffusion”.  
From Schumpeter’s definition, Stewart (2010) proffered different forms of innovation, and 
hence theorised on the conditions under which it is supported, or inhibited, by regulation. 
Stewart’s (2010) study was across various industries and provided empirical evidence from of 
the phenomenon from multiple perspectives. Therefore, it attempted to provide the uncommon 
abstract view of the regulation-innovation phenomenon. His study therefore provides a firm 
foundation to analyse the role of regulators and regulation in innovation. 
Prior to Stewart (2010), the regulation-innovation phenomenon as an abstract concept was 
sparsely and sporadically explored by e.g. Ashford, Ayers & Stone (1985), where the authors 
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explored the use of regulation to change the market for innovation. Ashford et al. (1985, p.423) 
provided a model for regulation induced technological innovation and suggested a regulation 
design that affects technological innovation. This model was adapted from erstwhile models 
that originated from specific industries such as chemical, pharmaceutical and automobiles.  
Notably, whilst Ashford et al’s (1985) model was somewhat abstractive, it focused mainly on 
technological innovations hence deficient in other forms of innovation. Stewart’s (2010) work 
gleans some insights from Ashford et al’s. (1985) propositions to form the discussions around 
regulatory stringency and innovation, which is one of the key propositions in the discussions. 
From the 85 odd sources cited in Stewart’s (2010) work, all but five of the regulation-
innovation studies were conducted in specified industries, organisations or under very specific 
conditions (see Figure 1). In these studies, specific niche issues on the regulation-innovation 
relationship are examined.  
As an example, the works cited in Stewart (2010), such as Aerni (2004), focused on issues of 
“risk, regulation and innovation in the case of Aquaculture and Transgenic Fish”, whereas the 
work by Davies (1983) studied the "Effects of Federal Regulation in the Chemical Industry", 
and Ollinger and Fernandez-Cornejo (1998) focused on innovation in the Pesticide industry. 
Aquaculture, Chemicals, and Pesticides have very specialised, specific and technical 
regulation-innovation considerations that cannot be readily applied in other industries such as 
railways or financial markets, for example. That notwithstanding, abstraction may well be 
possible from the innovation-regulation concepts gleaned from the narrow studies, an example 
being either management’s response to the introduction or a change in regulation.  
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Figure 4: Innovation-regulation studies based on Stewart (2010) 
Source: Stewart (2010) 
From these observations, it appears from literature that specific industry-firm-issue contexts 
are germane to conclusions about the regulation-innovation relationship. In essence, industry, 
firm and socio-political-technical contexts cannot be ignored in the study of the regulation-
innovation phenomenon. Therefore, if still at all necessary, generic and abstractive conclusions 
can only be arrived at after gleaning and considering the specific innovation-regulation issues 
affecting the relevant industries.  
Ashford & Hall (2011, p. 279) advance three important contextual conditions that must prevail 
for regulation to support innovation i.e. willingness, opportunity/motivation and capability to 
innovate. Accordingly, Ashford & Hall (2011) posit that these factors are interrelated, hence 
affect each other. The presence of a willingness, opportunity and capability in the context must 
be on both sides i.e. the regulator and the regulated firms. The centricity of context in 
regulation-innovation analysis could be the reason generic studies of the phenomenon with no 
specific industry or situation tentacles are less common compared to the industry-firm-issue 
driven studies. 
The pervasive theoretical constructs that underpin the regulation-innovation phenomenon due 
to the abstractness of the arguments advanced therein are the CET Theory and the Porter 
Hypothesis. CET stands out as the main antagonist of regulation induced innovation, whilst the 
Porter Hypothesis highlights latent innovation possibilities that can be brought forth by 
regulations.  
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2.7 The costs of regulation on innovation from a CET perspective 
Regulation is also commonly viewed as costly to innovation mainly due to the proposition that 
the resources spent on regulation would have been spent on innovation in the absence of 
regulation. The identification, analysis and extent of the costs is mainly in the domain of CET 
theory (e.g. Schiller, 2008) and not so much in the Porter Hypothesis.  
Porter theorises mainly on how regulation induces innovation, but falls short in stating the costs 
thereof. Contrarily, Schiller (2008, p.553) nuances the cost burdens proposed by CET theory 
further and codifies them in distinct categories, i.e. administrative, compliance and efficiency 
costs. By implication, regulatory cost burdens are viewed as opportunity costs to innovation, 
as well as knowledge creation and development. Schiller’s (2008) primary thesis herein is that 
in the absence of the burden of regulation, firms will invest more on the exploration and 
exploitation of new knowledge, hence innovate. The proposition further posits that even in case 
where regulation achieves perfect outcomes, the costs of achieving these may outweigh the 
benefits. The principle therefore is that the marginal benefit of regulation must in comparison 
exceed its marginal costs. If this is not the case, regulation is not a desirable option even if it 
were to improve market outcomes in the short run.  
Regarding the administrative costs of regulation, Schiller (2008, p.556) describes them as the 
costs of information required by a regulatory body for it determine the “shape and position of 
the demand and cost curves”. Such information, according to Schiller, allows it to make precise 
decisions and issue directives on the key regulatory variables, typically the structure, 
behaviour, prices and entry. In all likelihood, Schiller (2008) posits that such information must 
be regularly gathered, processed and analysed by a myriad of subject matter experts (Menez, 
2013: p.578).  
Unlike the administrative costs which are primarily borne by the regulatory agencies, 
compliance costs are mainly applicable to the regulated firm, usually in the private sector. For 
the regulated firm, the introduction of new regulations will most likely require adaptations of, 
and, or additions into current practices and process. These come at a cost. In some cases, new 
regulations mean the complete abandonment of existing business models and practices.  
The efficiency costs are a function of a change in consumer tastes and the emergence of modern 
technologies which inevitably cause changes in the cost structures and cost curves. The market 
and regulatory cost consideration in this regard, is the ability of the regulatory agencies to 
change their practices, processes and laws in alignment or in anticipation of the changes in the 
market environment.  
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
32 
The thesis of efficiency costs posits that if regulators, and regulation, fail to adapt 
proportionately with the changes in the market, the regulators may impede on new production 
techniques, marketing approaches and modern technology. The impact of the efficiency costs 
of regulation are likely felt by both the regulated firms and the regulatory agencies. For the 
regulator and regulation to stay relevant and to justify its continued presence, it must create the 
necessary agility to align with the changes brought by technology and changes in consumer 
taste. Again, this requires resources for knowledge exploration and exploitation endeavours.  
CET analysis of regulation and innovation gives impetus to the push for deregulation of various 
industries. Aggregately, this analysis concludes that regulation increases production costs, 
diverts resources from R&D, and consequently hinders innovation (Ashford & Hall, 2011, p. 
276). 
2.8 The Porter Hypothesis, and innovation dimensions of regulation 
The first real challenge to the claims by CET analysis that regulation increases production 
costs, diverts resources from R&D and thus hinders knowledge development hence innovation 
is credited to the Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT) in the late 1970s. The MIT, 
commenting particularly on environmental innovation, supported the view that properly 
formulated regulation and regulations, can transform products and processes and confer health 
and economic benefits (Ashford & Hall, 2011, p. 276). This view was widely popularised and 
supported by the advent of the Porter Hypothesis in 1991 which provided an aggressive 
dissenting view to the CET theory. Virtually all economists until 1991 were generally of the 
view that regulation, especially environmental regulation, restricted their scope and thus 
reduced their options.  
Porter (1991) as cited in Ashford & Hall (2011, pp. 276 – 278) and in Stewart (2010, p.8), 
essentially posited that regulation, thus regulators, induce rather than hinder innovation, hence 
the creation and development of knowledge. The Porter Hypothesis holds that regulations can 
create conditions favourable to new entrants into the market, thereby resulting in the inflow 
and emergence of different production techniques and processes. As they become aware of new 
competitors, incumbent firms in the regulated industry feel confronted and are thus spurred to 
develop new ideas of their own. They thus invest in knowledge exploration and innovation – 
an investment that would have otherwise not have been made in the absence of regulation 
(Ashford & Hall; 2011, p.277).  
In explaining the Porter Hypothesis in even more detail, Stewart (2010, p.3) proffers three 
“innovation dimensions of regulation” – i.e. regulatory information, stringency, and flexibility. 
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According to Stewart (2010), new regulations can change along these three innovation 
dimensions. On the information dimension, Stewart (2010, p.3) proposes that regulation can 
promote “more complete information” about the product and processes in the market place. A 
poignant example illustrating the information dimension of regulation is found in the regulation 
of product package labels that disclose information about the product, such as ingredients used, 
quantities, methods of production, expiry dates, side effects and such-like. Such labels reduce 
information asymmetry in the market, especially on the consumer side. This thus effectively 
prevents one side of the market from having less information about the products and the market. 
The mitigation of information asymmetry may also help offset the compliance burden espoused 
in the classical analysis of the phenomenon and thus reduce the risk of “dud” inventions. 
The importance of the information dimension is perhaps highly evident when the regulator and 
regulation certifies the quality of a product. In this way, Stewart (2010, p.3) notes that the 
regulator’s certification is a compliance value add to the product and by extension to the 
producer. Mutually, by complying with the regulations set by the regulator, the producer fulfils 
its compliance expectations whilst the regulator attests and endorses (overtly or tacitly) the 
producer’s product attributes as being of the appropriate quality, safety and integrity. The 
regulator further endorses the producer overtly, or tacitly, as an upstanding “production 
citizen”. As such, a regulator certified product is likely to fetch a normal or even higher value 
in the market thus increasing the producer’s return on investment.  
The stringency dimension of regulation and innovation is according to Ashford et al. (1985, 
p.426) cited in Stewart (2010, p.4) the principal factor influencing technological innovation. 
Regulatory stringency refers to the “the degree of change required for compliance innovation” 
(Stewart, 2010, p.4). When regulatory requirements are highly stringent, a significant amount 
of change may be required from the firm for it to achieve regulatory compliance thus 
inexplicably increasing the compliance burden of the firm. As espoused in the CET analysis, 
an increased compliance burden on the firm is not desirable for innovation. Therefore, from 
the perspective of the Porter Hypothesis high regulatory stringency does not bode well for 
regulation induced innovation. 
However, highly stringent regulations do not eliminate the possibility for innovation (Ashford 
& Hall, 2011, p. 276). Contrarily, the Porter Hypothesis views stringent regulations as a 
possible trigger for innovation and the upgrading and re-engineering of technology (Ashford 
& Hall, 2011, p. 276). The Porter Hypothesis further notes that companies who innovate despite 
the compliance burden of stringent regulations gain influence in the industry, are highly valued, 
but most enticingly, they harvest first mover advantages and capture the market. Also, learning 
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curve advantages are conferred to such companies for being first and early (Ashford & Hall, 
2011, p.276). 
The flexibility dimension can be classified into the either “command-and-control” or 
“incentives based regulations” (Stewart, 2010, p. 5). On the command-and-control side, 
regulators and regulations take an instructive view of regulation. For example, a firm may be 
ordered to lower its prices or increase its output. In such cases, regulation induced innovation 
may be a challenge due to the narrowed scope and limited options about implementation paths. 
On the other hand, incentives based regulations make particular firm behaviours more 
profitable to pursue, hence likely to trigger its willingness and motivation to innovate. Firms 
thus weigh the regulatory incentives embedded in the desired behaviour against the market 
incentive if it were not to comply.  
2.9 Regulatory agencies 
Stemming from the inefficiencies highlighted in CET analysis, the regulatory agencies are thus 
perceived to be generally incompetent at best and corrupt at worst. Hence, it is a commonly 
held view about public regulators that they rarely succeed in achieving the social welfare 
objectives which they aspire to and purport to promote (Stewart, 2010: p.1). 
Scholarly literature on regulators depicts them as organisations beset with many problems and 
inefficiencies. Again, this view is rooted in CET analysis. One of such problems, highlighted 
in literature, is “regulatory capture”. This concept, according to Goldcare (2012, p.123), refers 
to a situation where regulators end up promoting the interests of the industry which they 
monitor. This they do inadvertently or knowingly to protect the industries or firms which they 
are meant to regulate.  
As Owen and Braeutigam (1978, p. 6) observe, “one the worst fears of regulatory agencies is 
the bankruptcy of the firms it supervises since this can cause instability”. Based on this fear, 
regulators unwittingly participate in cartels and stifle competition through means such as the 
strategic use of litigation, information and innovation management. 
Regulators are thus prone to industry lobby advances and accept things such as gifts, friendship 
and even opportunities to socialise since they speak the same language.  
 
“Lobbying occurs through the forging of close personal contact between the lobbyist and 
government officials whereby social events are crucial to this process. Accordingly, 
industry’s objective is to establish long term personal relationships transcending any 
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issue. Company and industry officials must be party to the agency decision not just 
organisational functionaries. A regulatory official contemplating a decision must be led 
to think of its impact in human terms. Officials must be less willing to hurt long time 
acquaintances than corporations.” (Owen and Braeutigam, 1978, p. 6). 
Evidently, Owen and Braeutigam’s (1978) thesis does not hold regulators in high regard and 
directly feeds into the deregulation movement’s assertions. However, their thesis has somewhat 
been discredited and derided as a mere “how to manual” for new and established industries, 
based on the authors’ own frustrating experiences in the regulatory game than the actual 
characterisation of how it typically occurs. 
 
The criticisms of these agencies are echoed amongst others by critics of the concept of social 
welfare regulation and clear proponents of self-regulation such as, the Chicago School of Law 
and Economics (see Stigler, 1971; Posner, 1974, Ellickson, 1994; OECD, 2000). In criticism 
of social welfare regulation, self-regulation champions also support the opportunity cost 
perspective espoused by CET analysis.  
2.10 Chapter conclusions 
Broadly, the literature review indicates that KM research has been largely focused in the private 
sector with very little focus in the public sector. As such, KM practices in the public sector are 
mainly premised on the findings from the private sector. No KM research conducted in regard 
to the practices and processes of the regulated gambling industry with a particular focus on the 
regulatory agencies’ knowledge contribution was found. As it is typically the case with the 
public sector, KM practices of public regulators are largely premised on research in the private 
sector. Therefore, the KM issues of the public sector and regulators, in particular, are largely 
unexplored, hence poorly highlighted and under-developed.  
With its focus in the public sector and regulators, this thesis occupies this space and aims to 
address KM issues, particularly knowledge development practices in the public sector using 
the public regulator as a basis. Furthermore, the literature review of the regulation and 
knowledge development for innovation phenomenon strongly suggests that a narrow focus and 
the context where the issues are explored are critical in the analysis. Unsurprisingly, many of 
the reviewed sources have followed this route. It is also clear that findings about the 
relationship from specific industries are not always automatically applicable to the next 
industry being studied. As a result, abstract conclusions about this relationship are always based 
on a fusion of multiple findings from different industries and firm’s situations.  
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Although CET explains the cost of regulation on innovation, and largely classifies these in 
terms of efficiency, administrative and compliance costs based on the industry context 
sensitivity of the subject, there may well be many other costs which are not yet highlighted by 
the literature. Probably the catalogue of costs presented in the literature can never be 
exhaustive, hence there is always scope to uncover and highlight more of such costs. For 
example, the costs associated with culture is an obvious omission in the study of the regulation 
and knowledge development for innovation phenomenon. It may well be that certain cultural 
contexts are tolerant to volatility and high rate of change, hence likely to embrace regulation 
induced knowledge development and innovation. Whereas in other cultures, stability and 
predictability may be more desirable, hence such an environment will be more tolerant to 
regulation that seeks to enforce and maintain the status quo.  
Still maintaining the importance of context in the study of the phenomenon, it follows that 
regulation and knowledge development for innovation issues will differ from region to region, 
country to country, and continent to continent. Therefore, variables and combinations of the 
phenomenon are infinite, thus always leaving scope to study the subject much further.  
In light of the available literature, and more particularly the literature reviewed herein, it 
appears that the studies in this area are still in their infancy. As such, there is vast scope to 
explore the subject from many possible dimensions.  
In this regard, I have opted to pursue it from the perspective of the regulatory agencies due to 
their centrality in the regulation space. More abstractly, my focus is on how regulators impact 
knowledge development, hence innovation. The literature review in this respect shows that this 
perspective and context of knowledge development are largely unexplored.  
The main account of regulators towards knowledge development and innovation is mainly 
negative and stereotypically explained through the lens of CET. Hence, regulators are generally 
not held in high regard and seen as inhibitors of innovation. Whilst the Porter Hypothesis attests 
through empirical evidence that regulation bears properties of knowledge development for 
innovation, the available literature does not address the role of the regulators in the innovation 
processes. This is a highly notable omission since the regulators are the implementers and 
custodians of the regulations.  
It is noted from the Porter Hypothesis that regulation – the process, and not the regulators – the 
processors is hailed as a potential knowledge development and innovation driver. However, 
the literature seems oblivious to the efficacy of the processors in the process. Instead the view 
that regulators are not good for innovation still holds firm and continues to be perpetuated. That 
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notwithstanding, this posture is perhaps justified by the fact that the Porter Hypothesis is a 
recent theoretical construct that is based on empirical evidence of the study of the phenomenon. 
Thus far, not many empirical studies have been conducted to understand regulators as 
contributors to knowledge development for innovation.  
This thesis desires to contribute to this discourse by empirically highlighting the knowledge 
development for innovation from the perspective of regulators, rather than the regulation itself. 
Since context and specificity have proven based on the literature review to be central in such 
studies, this thesis focuses in the regulated gambling industry context in South Africa. Since 
regulated gambling in South Africa is very broad and diverse, the study will focus on a 
gambling product that has, and continues to be, a source of controversial debates in that 
industry, which is the EBT.   
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Chapter 3 – Empirical perspective of regulation: a gambling 
industry consideration 
 
3.1 Introduction 
In the scheme of the literature review in Chapter 2, and the generic prescripts for knowledge 
development for innovation, questions arise as to which direction the gambling industry aligns 
itself. As such, its configuration and organisation of relationships are considered to determine 
inclination towards either CET or the Porter Hypothesis. Furthermore, do these collaborations 
and alliances favour a knowledge development contribution towards innovation of products 
such as the EBTs whilst in the diffusion process?  In light of these considerations, this chapter 
outlines and explains the relationships, alliances and collaborative networks of the industry and 
the various key stakeholders. These relationships are later viewed through the lens of 
knowledge development and innovation to illuminate the contribution of the regulator in this 
respect.  
 
3.2 Overview of the regulated South African Gaming Industry  
Gambling and its regulation is a business of information and knowledge. Behind the leisure, 
entertainment and social aspects of gambling and its regulation lies a foundation built on solid 
information, or knowledge. The games played are premised on highly complex mathematical 
and probability theoretical concepts, whilst the systems and technological artefacts to monitor 
these are based on very complex algorithms and designs. Yet the shelf life of such products is 
very short thus requiring constant knowledge creation and innovation. In general, and as a 
system, gambling is a dynamic industry wherein organisation’s survival requires constant 
generation and application of new knowledge to yield innovation. To illustrate, the nine 
provinces of South Africa approve approximately 3000 new gambling products and conduct 
an average of 1500 changes on the gambling floors each per annum (MGB, 2015). 
 
The industry is also grappling with many diverse issues which thus demand the continuous 
application of all knowledge processes of creation, integration, sharing and application. At a 
policy level legislators and regulators are considering whether to license more forms of 
gambling, for example, dog racing, whether to increase the stakes and prizes in the Limited 
Payout Machine (LPM) sector, how to best regulate EBTs and how to tackle illegal gambling 
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(GRC, 2015, pp. 11- 13). Whilst the incumbent operators must consider and contend with the 
new competitors who are entering the market, already at an advantageous position due to their 
technologies and reduced barriers. At the same time, they must gradually embrace and 
incorporate the new technologies without interrupting their existing operations. Manufacturers, 
on the other hand, must consider feedback from the operators and ensure the delivery of 
products that will be acceptable to the market and profitable. All this must be done in the 
context of ever changing legislative requirements which must be adhered to. 
 
For such reasons, it is apparent that those in the industry who create new knowledge quickly 
and frequently are able to embed such knowledge into artefacts and processes that are diffused 
and acceptable to the end users, will enjoy much sustained competitive advantage and likely to 
thrive.  
 
Apart from horse racing and sports betting, before 1996 most other forms of gambling were 
prohibited, therefore illegal in South Africa. The Gambling Act of 1965 was the central 
legislation and outlawed almost any kind of gambling in the country. However, the advent of 
the erstwhile Bantustans within the borders of South Africa in 1976 allowed the independent 
homelands of Transkei, Bophuthatswana, Venda and Ciskei (TBVC) to introduce their own 
gambling legislation (NGB, 2010). This resulted in the legalisation of casinos and lotteries 
gambling within the independent states.  
 
The dawn of the new Constitution of the Republic of South Africa in 1993 (“the Constitution”) 
allowed for the re-incorporation of the independent states into South Africa and further 
permitted gambling license holders from the TBVC states to legally conduct gambling under 
the new dispensation.  
 
For the rest of South Africa, it was only in 1996 that many other varieties of gambling were 
legalised after the findings and recommendations of the Wiehahn Commission of 1995 (“the 
Commission”). In the main, the Commission recommended the general legalisation of 
gambling, but subject to strict control. It envisaged that legalisation will amongst other things 
ensure the integrity and fairness of gambling and protect the players from overstimulation of 
its latent demand. Furthermore, it was expected that the industry will be a significant source of 
revenue and employment which augurs well for economic growth and development of the 
country (Wiehahn Commission, 1995). 
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Since the Constitution recognised the competency of the provincial governments to legislate 
on several issues, including gambling, the National Government promulgated the National 
Gambling Act of 1996 which provided for concurrent jurisdiction on gambling matters. All 
nine provincial governments swiftly activated the provisions of the National Gambling Act that 
allowed them to license and legislate on functional areas of casinos and other forms of 
gambling. As such, the first legal casino was opened in the Mpumalanga Province in the latter 
parts of 1997 with many others following suite from 1998 onwards (NGB, 2010).  
3.3 Growth of the industry and emergent challenges 
Since the implementation of the legislative framework, the gambling industry has seen rapid 
growth and development (GRC, 2010). Although the Wiehahn Commission only envisaged 
five forms of gambling modes i.e. lottery, sport pools, casinos, Bingo and betting (Wiehahn 
Commission, 1995, p.114), various new modes have since emerged mainly through 
technological advancements. 
 
For instance, the LPM sector, which is modelled around casino slot machines but at a much 
lower scale to target lower ends of the market, or EBTs, which fuse traditional Bingo and casino 
slots gaming into a single offering. Like the original casino formats, the LPM and EBTs have 
developed and formed into independent self-sustaining gambling sectors. There are indications 
that even more modes of gambling may be introduced in light of ongoing discussions and 
arguments for online gambling, or dog racing amongst others.  
 
However, as the industry grew, challenges have also emerged particularly due to the 
technological advancements and the persistence of sophisticated forms of illegal gambling 
activities, such as interactive gambling. Whilst technology has presented significant 
opportunities which were rightly exploited by the industry, it has also created the problem of 
proliferation and may have overstimulated the latent demand for gambling. In this regard, 
technologies such as the internet and mobile devices have blurred the lines of regulation and 
diluted existent definitions of the forms of gambling that are permissible in law (GRC Report, 
2010, p.183). These new forms of gambling have increased competition and threatened existing 
forms of gambling such as casinos who have built their business models on older fixed forms 
of technology that are difficult and costly to replace. 
 
Also, in some cases the entry barriers have been significantly lowered, for example, previous 
legislative requirements demanded prospective licensees to have security of tenure on the land 
where they built, graded hotels with predetermined number of rooms, conference, and 
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convention centres amongst others. Whereas current applicants such as in Bingo operators are 
only required to create jobs and provide evidence of economic and community benefits (CASA, 
2015, p.15). 
 
Therefore, new entrants are able to enter the industry with lower capital investments and incur 
a fraction of the operational costs. This has led to much consternation in the industry especially 
from the existing operators who no longer feel protected by the gambling legislation and policy 
makers. 
3.4 Industry composition and relationships  
In broad terms, the gambling industry is comprised of legislators responsible for promulgating 
the laws of regulation and these include the National and Provincial Governments. At the 
second level is the regulators that are responsible for advising the legislators and the 
implementation of the regulations. At the third level is the manufactures and operators who 
design, manufacture, and distribute the product. At the last level are the operators such as 
casinos and LPM sites who operate gambling products and interface with the end users. 
 
 
Figure 5: Relationships and interactions in the gambling industry 
Source: Personal collection 
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The relationships in this regard characterise high diversity, complex interdependence, 
dynamism, with many centres and sources of knowledge. It is comprised of manufacturers, 
operators and regulators, and congregates diverse skills and professionals, from engineers and 
designers to lawyers and accountants. The subdivision, or categorising, of licences into 
different sectors such as casinos, Bingo, LPMs and Horseracing entrenches the diversity and 
complexity even further. 
 
The different sectors of the industry also use varying types of technological artefacts, games 
and product which are themselves products of knowledge creation and innovation. Albeit for 
different purposes, all the participants generate and consume knowledge in pursuit of different 
strategic purposes, broadly exploration, exploitation or a combination of the two.  
 
Although the participants are competitors with different interests, they are brought together by 
legislation which requires and fosters collaboration and inter-reliance amongst them. As an 
example, manufacturers are proscribed from operating, whilst operators do not manufacturer 
the products. To cross the divide between operating and manufacturing, the participant must 
obtain the appropriate license which will classify and restrict them accordingly. That 
notwithstanding, the products from the various manufacturers must be compatible with each 
other. For example, manufacturers of central monitoring systems (CMS) must ensure that their 
systems communicate effectively with gambling machines manufactured by a different 
manufacturer. Conversely, the manufacturer of the machines and games must design them such 
that they are compatible with the monitoring system from another company.  
 
The interoperability requirements imposed on the manufacturers allow the operators to 
harmoniously offer a diverse range of products on their floors whilst also satisfying the 
requirements imposed by the regulator. Intrinsically, for product manufacturers to exist there 
must be operators who have the wherewithal and willingness to offer the products. All of this 
must occur under the watchful eye of a duly appointed regulator. Therefore, the knowledge 
creation ingredient of collaboration and self-managed project based teams (Newell et al., 2009, 
p.234) must, by law, be always available for the industry to exist.  
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 Factor   Regulators     Firms in industry  
  Legislators Regulators  Manufacturers Operators 
Composition  ° 1 National  
° 9 Provincial  
° 1 National  
° 9 Provincial 
° Technical 
Standards  
 12 nationally 
licensed  
° Casinos 
° Bookmaking 
° Bingo  
° LPM Sites 
Role  Legislative & 
policy making 
Advise, research & 
implement 
legislation & 
policy 
 Design, 
manufacturing & 
distribution 
(product/concept 
owners) 
Operations  
Sales 
Public interface 
Interactions  National & 
Provincial 
Regulators 
Legislators; 
manufacturers & 
operators 
 Regulators & 
operators. 
Manufacturers & 
Regulators 
Table 2: Relationships; Interactions & Roles 
Source: Personal collection 
3.5 Networked and collaborative innovation in the industry  
Given that, the knowledge development process is often a networked multi-directional and 
multifaceted process; collaboration becomes a compulsory requirement. Furthermore, given 
that the newly created knowledge will almost always be premised on pre-existing ideas hence 
a “re-packaging” and “re-incarnation” of erstwhile ideas, it is inevitable that other people will, 
and must, contribute to the product. 
For example, in cases of legally protected products through copyrights, trademarks patents and 
suchlike, the “next innovating” company must request and obtain permission and 
documentations from the owners of the base product. As such, by extension, the qualifications 
and attitudes of these external firms towards knowledge development and innovation becomes 
critical to the diffusion of the new products (OECD, 2000, p.163).  
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Figure 6: Gambling industry knowledge development & innovation network 
Source: Personal collection 
Whilst the next innovating firm will for purposes of speed, competitive advantage and profit 
rather not involve too many external participants in the process, the innovation system demands 
their involvement. In case of the gambling industry and the model product under consideration, 
for it to succeed as a knowledge product, the prevailing “innovation system”, contemplated by 
Lundvall (1992) and others, demanded the presence of the following collaborative elements: 
i) A legislative framework: This is created by the various spheres of government. Since 
gambling is a regulated competence, innovators ought to be informed of the limitations 
and expectations regarding products. This thus informs the innovation scope of the 
initiator, hence the budgets and timelines. Without the legislative framework, the 
manufacturer may incur unnecessary innovation costs and the product run into diffusion 
difficulties with authorities.  
 
ii) A technical testing framework: Tests on the new products such as EBTs must be 
conducted by accredited testing laboratories. The tests are conducted in line with 
accreditations and prescribed technical requirements. For the product creator, this 
provided assurance that the tests will be thorough, fair and the results thereof will be 
accurate. This thus provides certainty that if the product passes the test it is more likely 
to be allowed for diffusion. 
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iii) A certification framework:  Confirming the evaluation of the test report and the 
compliance thereof against the applicable technical standard. This confirms to the 
submitter that the product is of the expected standard and paves the way for its 
submission to the relevant regulators. 
 
iv) Approval by the public regulators: This is the first stage of the product’s diffusion to 
the end user and it provides assurance to potential operators that the product has gone 
through the relevant processes. It will perform as claimed in terms of revenue, safety, 
security, fairness and auditability.  
 
v) Machine operators: These are comprised of casinos, Bingo halls and LPM sites, 
amongst others. An uptake and long-term operation by these operators confirms that 
the product is of acceptable standards and an endorsement of its features and attributes. 
Such knowledge may thus be used by the manufacturer as a basis for the development 
of further products or the creation of other variations of the same product.  
 
Without the knowledge creation and innovation network depicted by Figure 6, the knowledge 
product from the innovator fails and likely to be shelved and internally appreciated. The view 
that the various checkpoints as well as the multiple parties in the process of approving new 
products in the gambling industry as outlined, which essentially refers to the regulation of the 
industry are an additional barrier to the diffusion of the product, is biased and incomplete (see 
Shleifer; 2005, p.440). The point that is easy to miss is the various learnings and knowledge 
contribution into the product by the different institutions.  After all, innovation hence 
knowledge creation and development do not occur in isolation.   
At the point where the manufacturer is satisfied that it has a product that is good enough to 
solicit a positive test report from the test-laboratory, Schumpeterian learning posits that the 
innovation is not final but still subject to further knowledge development. At such a point, the 
innovation is merely a hypothesis of what the completed product may be and thus subject to 
the interpretive schemes of the various regulatory agencies that must evaluate and approve it 
(Boisot, 1998). The availability of a tangible and visible functional product exhibits an 
advanced stage in the research and development process of the product, but does not imply the 
availability and diffusion-readiness of such.  
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3.6 Knowledge development contribution by different collaborators 
The difference in roles and interests on the product by the various stakeholders involved in the 
process thus require the companies to ask different knowledge developmental questions about 
the product. Since the manufacturer as the originator of the product is interested in the product 
attributes that will set it apart from the competitors its questions and interests will be around 
features that sets it apart and highlighting the attributes that make it better than the competition. 
Accordingly, the knowledge gleaned from answering these attribute-related questions is useful 
in the further development or elimination of undesired attributes of the product.  
The test laboratory’s role is primarily that of the first external examiner of the product; in that 
it provides an independent opinion about the product against approved industry standards. 
Similarly, such knowledge is returned to the originator to consider inclusion or removal from 
the product. The certifying authority also contains advisory elements in its evaluation since it 
will inform the originator of the product whether the relevant criteria is met, and as to which 
jurisdiction(s) the product is likely to satisfy the approval and diffusion requirements. The CA’s 
role is somewhat similar to that of the regulator in terms of the advisory features, however, the 
latter’s questions will always tend to be biased towards public interest considerations.  
Operators as the final evaluators of the product are just like the manufacturer interested in the 
commercial aspects of the product, i.e. whether it will ultimately yield profits. In summary, the 
process and requirements for diffusion products such as the EBT in the gambling industry 
develops knowledge from a design (manufacturer), technical (test laboratory), legal and public 
interest (CA and the Regulator), and a commercial point of view. All the contributors and 
contributions from these collaborators are outcomes of a knowledge development processes 
embarked upon by the entities which ultimately provides feedback to the originator and the 
product itself. 
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Table 3: Typical questions, feedback, contribution & and actions of collaborators 
 q1 q2 q3 q4 q5 
Element 
 
Manufacturer Test Lab Certifying 
Authority 
Regulator Operator 
(casinos, LPMs, 
Bingo etc.) 
 
 
 
 
Typical 
Questions 
° Is it different? 
° Will it sell 
enough(q5)? 
° Is it better? 
° Can it be 
certified 
(q3)/approved 
(q4)? 
° Is it safe? 
° Does it/will 
comply 
(q3/q4)? 
° Will it be 
certified 
(q3)? 
 
° Does it meet 
certifying 
criteria (q3)? 
° Which 
jurisdiction is it 
appropriate 
(q4)? 
° Is it safe, fair 
& 
accurate(q4)
? 
° Can it be 
audited(q4)? 
° Will it cause 
harm(q5)? 
° Will the 
regulator allow 
it (q4)? 
° Will my 
customers like it 
(q5)? 
° Is it better than 
what I have 
(q1)? 
° Will it improve 
my revenue 
(q5)? 
Feedback 
direction  
To q2, q3, q4 & 
q5 
All to the manufacturer (q1) 
Knowledge 
contribution 
“Greenfield” Technical/advi
sory 
Secondary/advis
ory 
Legal & public 
interest 
Commercial  
PO 
Actions/option
s 
Further 
research/develop
ment 
Implement 
Further 
research 
development  
Correct non-
compliance 
Further 
research/dev. 
Correct non-
compliance 
Further 
research/dev. 
Improve attributes 
Further 
research/dev. 
Source: Personal collection 
3.7 Analysing knowledge strategies and processes in the gambling industry  
3.7.1 Manufacturers and operators  
The composition of the regulated gambling industry in South Africa and the relationships 
between or amongst its participants provides notable examples of knowledge exploring and 
exploiting firms. It also provides some of the best examples of collaboration to create 
knowledge assets that yield sustained competitive advantage.  
 
In this respect, industry stakeholders such as manufacturers and operators are more inclined to 
explore knowledge since their environment requires new products regularly to meet the 
demands of their often-fickle customers and to counter competition (Newell et al., 2009). The 
knowledge assets resulting from their activities are often systematically formalised and 
codified mass-produced artefacts which are manufactured to fine tolerances and little variation. 
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For example, the slot machines and games used in casinos and elsewhere in the industry must 
comply with very specific standards and accreditations. Once certified against these, they can 
be mass produced to the exact specification as certified. Failure to manufacture the machines 
and design games in accordance with the standards almost certainly results in it being rejected 
by the regulators thus barring it from diffusion to the end users.  
 
For the manufacturers and operators, the artefacts such as gambling machines and their 
catalogue of games represents their knowledge assets which they protect through various 
means such as patents, copyrights, trademarks and encryptions, amongst other forms. But with 
the understanding that the economic value of these assets is not indefinite (Boisot, 1998, p.3), 
and that the knowledge base that sustains these assets changes, the firms continuously explore 
knowledge to sustain the asset’s knowledge base and prolong their usefulness.  
 
On average, manufacturers introduce approximately 200 new products per annum in each of 
the nine provinces where they are licensed whilst the operators change and re-configure the 
offering at least 900 times per annum (MGB; 2015). 
3.7.2 Legislators and regulators 
Since gambling is a regulated industry, the implementation of the new knowledge assets is 
dependent upon the various regulators. They determine the traditional regulation variables of 
price, entry, timing and innovation (Owen & Breautigam,1978, p.6). In this regard, variables 
such as the number and type of licences, the number of products and the location of such are 
legislated nationally and provincially and enforced by the various regulators (GRC, 2010, 
p.32). Using casino and LPM licenses as examples, it has been determined and legislated 
nationally that 40 casino licenses can be issued and 50000 LPMs (phase 1) can be licensed 
(GRC, 2010, pp.57-59).  
 
Unlike the manufacturers and operators, regulators are mostly inclined to favour knowledge 
exploitation strategies and less concerned about discovery of new knowledge. Within the 
confines of legislation, regulators typically favour efficiency savings and identification of new 
markets (Newell et al., 2009, p. 232). As such, their composition and organisation of resources 
differs in accordance with their strategic knowledge purposes. The differences are such that at 
the legislator and regulator levels, more formal structures like consulting firms may be 
prevalent, whilst the manufacturers may tend to be creative oriented and less informal. At the 
operators’ level, it may be more of a Taylorism arrangement (Newell et al., 2009, p.6).  
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Consistent with the theoretical review and constructs in Chapter one, regulators set the 
framework and parameters whilst manufacturers aim to create new products within such 
frameworks and operators implement the discoveries. This is not to say the roles do not overlap 
within and across the different industry participants.  
 
It is from these strategic knowledge purposes that conflict or synergies emerge, especially when 
a knowledge exploration leaning firm must collaborate with knowledge exploiting firm(s) for 
innovation to occur. The collaboration is legislatively induced in the main and not the ideal 
preference of either parties. Arguments have been made to the extent that this is a toxic 
relationship and a power struggle tilted in favour of regulators in the statutory sense, and of 
manufacturers in the innovation-knowledge creation/development sense. Notably because 
regulators are creatures of statutes and legislated monopolies with very little to no incentive to 
explore new knowledge for their subsistence, whereas their licensees (manufacturers and 
operators) in the private sector must explore and develop knowledge for survival.  
3.8 Chapter conclusions 
Given the processes, relationships and interactions in the gambling industry, the questions 
whether this network promotes knowledge development by the regulated entities and the 
regulator, or whether such a network stifles it, can be best answered by empirical evidence. On 
the surface of the configuration, it appears that there are too many layers of evaluation (e.g. 
PO, laboratory, CA, Regulator & operators) which may impose an unnecessary cost and 
compliance burden on the innovator, delaying diffusion of the product thereby inhibiting 
knowledge development and innovation.  
 
Nevertheless, this will largely depend on which side of the of the innovation spectrum the 
phenomenon is viewed. Certainly, from the licensee point of view reduced layers of evaluation 
and diffusion will augur well for the turnover of new and innovative products hence the 
increase in revenue. From the regulator’s point of view, the argument will likely highlight the 
necessity of these evaluation layers, since each layer is responsible for the development of 
knowledge about, and for the product which was likely not considered by the preceding layers 
of evaluation. The type of knowledge about and for the product differs according to the 
contributor’s input as required by legislative prescripts.  
 
Accordingly, the manufacturer provides the basic concept and platform of operation. This is a 
certain kind of knowledge development following a specific path of development. The 
laboratories, the CA, the public regulator and the operators all develop different types of 
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knowledge that eventually improves the product. From their strong public interest perspective, 
the regulator is likely to favour this configuration of the industry, since it appears to be thorough 
with sufficient fail-safe measures in place. Notwithstanding the possible views of the regulator 
and the manufacturer, the posture of this network against either CET or the Porter Hypothesis 
will become more apparent from empirical observations and analysis in the preceding chapters.   
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Chapter 4 – Empirical observations 
4.1 Introduction  
This chapter presents the empirical data collected using the methods described in Chapter 1. 
The data presented herein is comprised of organisational, semi-structured interviews and 
product data which was gleaned from documents and interviews. The organisational and 
interview data provides an overview of the organisation which will later be used to highlight 
its posture vis-a-vis knowledge creation and development. The product data is aimed at 
highlighting the product before the regulator’s involvement, and afterwards. 
4.2 Overview of the model regulatory body   
The MGB is a provincial public company established in terms of the Mpumalanga Gambling 
Act 1995, an Act of the provincial legislature from which it derives its powers and mandate.  
The organisation’s main activities are the issuance of gambling licenses and the subsequent 
inspection of gambling activities, products, regulation of entrants, and facilitation of the growth 
of the industry. The organisations’ activities are therefore informed by the requirements of the 
founding legislation, the policy prescripts of the provincial government and all other applicable 
ancillary legislation applicable to companies and public entities in particular. 
As at 31 December 2016, the organization had issued and had under its supervision 255 
gambling licenses comprised of three casinos, 163 LPM sites, 37 Bookmakers and nine Bingo 
operations. These licensees operated a total of 3247 different products amongst them. A large 
portion of the products are casino machines with a total of 1186, followed by LPMs with 777 
then Bingo with 1284 (MGB, 2016). 
Figure 7: Active gaming products 
Source: MGB annual report 2016 
36,58%
39,51% 
23,91% 
Active	gaming	products	
Casinos
Bingo
LPM
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Figure 8: Distribution of licenses in the Mpumalanga Province 
Source: MGB operational reports 
4.3 Organisation’s strategic posture 
 
The organisation’s vision is “to be at the forefront of effective regulation of the gambling 
industry”, whilst its mission is to ensure the integrity of gambling through efficient regulation 
of licensed gambling establishments. 
4.4 Organisation’s objectives  
 
The objectives of the organisation are as follows: 
i) “To perform the functions assigned in terms of the Act; 
ii) To ensure that the regulation of gambling is effective and efficient; 
iii) Render support to the Responsible Member on gambling issues and ensure that 
government’s policy on gambling is implemented; 
iv) Co-operate with the National Gambling and other stakeholder on matters of mutual 
interest; and 
v) Conduct research with a view to advise government on the socio-economic impact of 
gambling in the province.” 
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4.5 Organisational structure 
 
The organisational structure is comprised of four layers and the CEO is ultimately the 
accounting officer. The CEO reports to a Board of directors; and is also an ex-officio member 
of the Board and all its various sub-committees.  
The organisation’s activities are subdivided into six different sub-programmes. Three of the 
programs are responsible for “production” and the other three are support functions. The 
production programmes are Licensing, Gaming Control, and Audit.  All the programmes are 
managed by executive managers who are automatically members of the organisation’s 
executive management committee, and all report to the CEO.  
Below the executive managers are the investigators, etc. The production workers are the first 
line of contact employees who are mainly responsible for operations managers who are 
responsible for different operations portfolios e.g. casinos, systems, gathering and processing 
data under the immediate supervision of the operations managers. 
Figure 9: Adapted MGB organogram (2015/2016) 
Source: MGB annual report 2016 
4.6 Human resources  
 
The MGB’s average staff complement from 2012 to 2016 is 55.  Most (43%) of the employees 
are classified as skilled, whilst 26% are qualified professionals, semi-skilled workers at 18% 
and the rest, i.e. 13% are the executive managers. The skilled workers are mainly the production 
workers such as investigators, inspectors, and auditors, whilst the qualified workers refer to the 
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operations managers. The semi-skilled workers are comprised of the assistants such as 
secretaries, receptionist and messengers (MGB Annual Report; 2012 – 2016). 
 
Figure 10: MGB Staff composition 
Source: MGB annual report 2016 
 
Table 4: MGB Staff composition 
Source: MGB annual reports (2012 – 2016) 
4.7 Staff training 
The purpose of staff training, as the organisation sees it, is to ensure that it stays and keeps 
abreast of developments within its environment. Training needs are identified annually within 
the operational departments and are mainly informed by annual performance appraisals. Once 
the needs are identified, annual organisational training plans are formulated and appropriately 
funded. Staff training is one of the key performance objectives of the human resources function. 
Consistently, since the inception of the organisation staff training is included as a key strategic 
item of the organisation. 
 2012/13 2013/14 2014/15 2015/16 2016/17 Mode 
Senior managers 7 7 7 8 7 13% 
Professional qualified 12 13 13 13 13 26% 
Skilled 23 26 25 27 23 43% 
Semi-skilled 13 9 10 10 7 18% 
Unskilled 0 0 0 0 0 0% 
Total 55 55 55 58 50 100% 
Senior	managers;	13%
Qualified	
professionals;	26%;	
Skilled	;	43%
Semi-skilled;	18%
STAFF	COMPOSITION
Senior	managers
Qualified	professionals
Skilled	
Semi-skilled
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4.8 Education policy 
 
As a policy, the organisation provides educational assistance to its staff in the following 
manner: 
i) Full payment of tuition fees, examination fees and for the cost of all books directly to 
institutions of higher learning. 
 
ii) Study leave comprised of at least five days for exam preparation, study school attendance 
and research as applicable. Furthermore, employees are allowed at least one day off 
before each examination date and another day off for each examination. 
 
iii) Employees are required to submit examination results to the employer and are required 
to pass all their examinations. Where an employee fails a module, they are required to 
re-imburse the employer the costs of such a module and must fund such a module on 
their own should they wish to re-register. 
 
iv) Upon completion of a qualification at a registered and recognised higher education 
institution, employees are rewarded with a bonus payment of 5% of their total annual 
remuneration package. 
 
v) In the interim, employees are also required to remain in the employ of the organisation 
for at least one year after completing a qualification funded by the organisation. 
 
 Figure 11: Typical qualifications pursued by regulator's personnel 
Source: Annual reports 2012 – 2016  
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Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
56 
As shown in Figure 11, the employees are taking up higher education and professional 
qualifications. Master’s and Bachelor’s degrees are the most subscribed categories, both 
making close to 60% of the qualifications pursued and funded by the organisation. Certificates 
are the least pursued qualifications at just under 4% of all the qualifications.  
4.9 Interviews data 
4.9.1 Overview of respondents 
 
The interviews were conducted with three key personnel within the line department responsible 
for the evaluations and approvals of new products for use in the Mpumalanga Province. The 
said personnel comprised of two line managers who were directly involved in the processes 
and are currently responsible for ensuring continued compliance of the product as it operates. 
The two line managers have combined experience of over 30 years in the gambling industry 
and possess tertiary levels of education.  
The other respondent has over 20 years of experience in gambling regulation and overall 
experience in the gambling industry of 30 years. His career started in the operational side from 
a casino perspective. This respondent is a production worker with the official designation of an 
inspector, thus responsible for the continued inspections hence knowledge generation about 
gambling products.  
Table 5: Interview data 
Subject Position Role  Education 
level 
Experience Field of 
expertise 
Current 
studies 
Respondent 1 Operations 
Manager 
Management Tertiary +20 years Law 
enforcement 
None. 
Respondent 2 Operations 
Manager 
Management Tertiary +10 years Technical Yes. 
Respondent 3 Inspector Production  Tertiary +30 years Gaming 
Systems 
None. 
Source: Interviews 
The production worker is mainly responsible for the gathering of data and the monitoring of 
the gambling industry within the legislated parameters. This entails the planning of inspections 
such as identifying the areas of inspection, formulation of the scope, execution and reporting 
on the inspection. The management interviewees, mainly oversee and guide the production 
employee’s activities and also ensure the availability and allocation of the appropriate 
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resources. The insights from these interviews are discussed and analysed in detail in the next 
chapter.  
4.10 Model product – EBT  
4.10.1 Generic pre-diffusion requirements and processes  
 
The data shows that the process of introducing new products, such as the EBT, for consumption 
by the end users in the gambling industry is regulated and involves multiple stakeholders and 
processes (see National Gambling Act 2004, ss. 19-27). A review of the applicable legislation 
shows that, all gambling jurisdictions in South Africa have adopted similar legislative 
structures comprised of Acts, Regulations and Rules and they have all legislated on the 
requirements and processes applicable to manufacturers for bringing new products into the 
gambling market of their respective jurisdictions.  
Once the innovating company (often also the manufacturer) has discovered and created a 
gambling product, such must be submitted to a testing laboratory which is accredited for 
technical testing through the South African Accreditation System (SANAS) for testing. 
Currently three such laboratories are accredited and licenced to test and calibrate gambling 
products for use in the South African gaming market. 
In terms of the National Gambling Act, 2004, the laboratories are considered as testing agents 
and must test the products against the applicable standards, as well as the relevant provincial 
gambling legislation (National Gambling Act 2004, ss. 24 -25). At this level, a manufacturer 
is required to submit to the test laboratory all relevant documents, including software source 
codes and samples of the product to allow the laboratory to conduct the tests. Such tests include 
testing the functionality of the product, verifiability, statistical analysis, randomness and 
simulation of a live gambling environment amongst others (see, SABS (2008), SABS (2005), 
SABS (2003), SABS (2002), SABS (2005)). The laboratories remain in constant liaison with 
the manufacturer to clarify issues and to obtain additional information as necessary.  
At the end of the test, the laboratory issues a test report to the manufacturer which indicates, 
amongst other things, a detailed description of the product tested, the standards and relevant 
legislation against which the product was tested. Issues of non-compliance, matters of emphasis 
or caution, and a general statement or recommendation on whether the product is suitable for 
use in the various provincial jurisdictions or not are also included in the test report. 
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The test reports are submitted back to the manufacturers for consideration. At this point, the 
product is not yet certified since this certification must be carried out by the CA. Prior to 
submission to the CA and after consideration of the report from the test laboratory, the 
manufacturer may address any shortcomings identified by the test laboratory in order to 
improve its prospects of success. Upon receipt of the final report by the test laboratory from 
the manufacturer, the CA evaluates such against the relevant SANS standards and, if satisfied 
that the requirements have been met, issues a letter of certification (LOC) to the manufacturer. 
Again, at this point and prior to the issuance of the LOC, the CA may also liaise with either the 
manufacturer that produced the product or the test laboratory to clarify issues and hence the 
manufacturer can address any issues on the product as obviated. 
If an LOC is issued by the CA, the manufacturer may thus submit same to the intended 
provincial regulator for its approval for use in the relevant province. The regulator will then 
evaluate the product against the relevant provincial requirements and issue the final decision 
on whether the product is approved or rejected. If the product is approved, then operators, such 
as casinos, may purchase it from the manufacturer and offer it for use to the public after it has 
been verified by the inspectors of the regulator. Whilst in operation, the product is monitored 
for compliance and financial performance with such information also made available to the 
manufacturer if requested.  
The EBT model product was no exception, hence it underwent the exact processes prior to it 
being made available for public use.  
4.10.2 Model product submission and evaluation  
 
According to the documents at the regulator, the model product was submitted for approval 
and use in Mpumalanga in January 2006 and it was intended to be used in Bingo halls. The 
interviews supported by the reviewed documents highlighted that, although the available 
gambling legislation provided for the licensing of Bingo halls and games (see Mpumalanga 
Gambling Act, 1995), no such licenses were issued by the regulator at that point, therefore, 
there were no operational Bingo halls.  The applicable legislation did not, however, make 
provision for products such as the EBT although it did envisage electronic means of playing 
the game.  
The submission by the PO comprised of the administrative documents about the product, i.e. 
the LOCs and Test Reports, which detailed its technical components such as the cabinet, the 
server, the game themes and the ticketing system. From the processes explained in the 
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documents, the regulator ordinarily requires the submission of the administrative documents 
relating to the new product only, and conducts its evaluation for approval based on these. The 
administrative documents are usually considered sufficient by the regulator to decide on 
whether to approve a product or not. In this case, the regulator required over and above the 
administrative documents that the PO provides a sample of the product and that it conducts a 
demonstrative presentation of such.  
4.10.3 EBT product description 
The documents reviewed show that, in the submission, the PO described the product as “an 
apparatus used to play the game of Bingo and which allows multiple players to participate in 
a common game using a shared ball draw”. The submission was comprised of technical 
components and administrative features. 
The EBT product is based on the game of Bingo, but has been designed to as closely as possible 
mimic traditional casino slot machines. This is according to the submission made by the PO. 
A historical review of the game of Bingo, indicated that the game has been played since the 
15th century with its claimed origins credited to Europe. It has been played in South Africa 
since the 1960s and has since then undergone various changes and improvements (Mango, 
2006, p.9), but its conversion into the EBT form as we know it today has been the most radical 
and revolutionary.  
The game of Bingo is defined as;  
“A form of lottery in which balls or slips, each with a number and one of the letters B, I, 
N, G, or O, are drawn at random and players cover the corresponding numbers printed 
on their cards, the winner being the first to cover five numbers in any row or diagonal 
or, sometimes, all numbers on the card.” (www.dictionary.com).  
For the game to occur, several elements must be present. These are Bingo balls, cards that are 
divided into spaces with different numbers and symbols, and pictures arranged randomly 
(NGB, 2010). Furthermore, there must an announcer (a human being) who must call out the 
numbers. When the numbers are called, players daub, or mark the symbols and the first player 
to match the number with the patterns must call out “Bingo” and is recognised as the winner. 
Therefore, in its traditional and original sense, i.e. without the assistance of technology, the 
game of Bingo was played using a combination of animate and inanimate objects. 
On the EBT format of the game, the documents reviewed and the interviews conducted show 
that the manufacturer used its knowledge assets comprised of amongst others, its experience in 
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designing gambling games, and other related products to embed the game of Bingo into 
artefacts. The EBT allowed for the total automation of the Bingo game in that it replaced most 
of the items required to play such as the balls, tickets, drawing machines, daubing markers, 
cards and the announcer with electronic and virtual versions of these items. Through the EBT, 
all the elements of the game, even the payment of the winner, are carried out electronically and 
automatically whilst the key elements of the game, such as the participation of a minimum of 
two people, are retained.  
Being electronic and automated, and to distinguish the product from other electronic Bingo 
products, the manufacturer added features that are traditionally associated with casino 
gambling. These included virtual spinning reels, game themes, progressive jackpots, sound and 
lighting effects, amongst others. The added features were, and remain, the basis of the 
controversy in the gambling industry since they allegedly blurred the lines between the 
different forms and types of gambling products, hence classifying or codifying the product into 
a sector was a challenge.  
Distinguishing and classifying (codification) between and amongst gambling products by 
sector is critical in the gambling industry and is etched in the industry’s legislative and policy 
framework. Therefore, the EBT seemed to transcend these regulatory lines and perceived as 
undermining the existing regulatory and policy frameworks.  
4.10.3.1 Model product technical components  
The documents reviewed show that the EBT system was comprised of the following 
components: 
i) A cabinet featuring two touch screen LCD colour display monitors with a cabinet 
topper.  
ii) A server, which is a computer system that controls the database, accounting and game 
management functions. The Bingo server also contains the Random Number 
Generator (RNG) and manages ball draws and links players for competitive play. 
iii) Various game themes with software stored on approved storage devices. 
iv) Terminals which are the interface between the players and the Bingo game. Through 
the terminals, Bingo cards transactions are carried out, player credits are displayed 
and interim prizes awarded.  
v) An electronic ticketing system. 
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4.10.3.2 Model product’s administrative features  
 
The administrative features of the game as explained in the documents submitted by the PO 
comprised of the following: 
 
1. Test reports issued by test laboratories regarding tests conducted on the product against 
the relevant SABS specifications. Such tests included: 
 
i) Software evaluation: this included the evaluation of the game source codes against 
the standards; 
 
ii) Artwork verification: this was to ensure that the rules displayed to players are 
accurately explained and are aligned to the technical specifications by the PO; 
 
iii) Mathematical evaluation: to ensure that the theoretical return to player 
percentages in the technical documentation are in line with the PO’s specifications; 
 
iv) Combination test: the combinations displayed on the product were simulated to 
ensure that the product pays correctly; and 
 
v) Regression testing: testing was conducted to confirm performance of the product 
against a wide range of functions and failures.  
 
2. LOCs for the technical components. These were issued by the CA and they described the 
product, its origin, applicable jurisdictions, other products tested with it for 
interoperability, required and recommended configurations and conditions of use and 
method(s) of verifying the product. The LOCs further stated the jurisdictions where the 
product may be used based on the legislation considered during its testing. In this case 
the applicable jurisdictions were Mpumalanga and Gauteng. The LOCs also contained a 
statement of compliance against the applicable CA standard and the rules and regulations 
published by the regulators.  
 
The statement of compliance represents the CA’s views regarding the product and carries 
a significant amount of influence in the provincial regulator’s decision on whether to 
approve the product or not.  
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3. Game play features:  The product allowed multiple players to participate in a common 
game of “Bingo” through a linked system using technological aids. To play the game on 
the terminal, players are required insert currency or a bar coded ticket into its bill 
validator and they select a card from the cards that can be viewed on the terminals’ LCD 
screen. Players are only required to execute one touch to play it and utilises multi-
denomination games on a variety of game themes. Though different in outward 
appearance, each of the games are premised on identical Bingo play and rely on the 
players responding to shared ball draws to generate the game outcome.  
4.10.4 Public interest in the approval of the model product  
EBTs generate controversy wherever they are introduced, mainly because they supposedly blur 
the lines between traditional casino slot machines and the game of Bingo. The product has 
taken away the daubing of the traditional Bingo card by the players and the excitement of 
matching “wits with fellow players and keeping pace with the caller” (Bowser, 2017). 
Essentially, all these functions have been delegated to a single machine.  
The controversy surrounding the product was and still is a major issue in gambling circles, 
societal and political organisations. For Bingo hall operators, it generated renewed excitement 
hence an exponential growth in revenues. Whilst for casinos and other existing forms of 
gambling such as LPMs, it represented serious competition which will potentially affect their 
revenue negatively. Table 4 is a collection of article titles and their synopsis made by various 
parties regarding EBT between 2006 and 2016.  
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Table 6: EBT product in the media 
Date Author Title Synopsis Positi
on 
Reason(s) Category 
2006 Gauteng 
Gambling 
Board 
Approval of 
Bingo Terminals. 
Explanation of the process 
and considerations when 
approving EBTs. 
Pro-
EBTs 
In line with 
legislative 
provisions of the 
province. 
Regulator 
2007 T. Mango Regular gambler’s 
perception on 
Bingo. 
Qualitative study by 
National Gambling of 
perception on Bingo and 
EBTs. 
Neutr
al  
A study presenting 
findings & no 
recommendations. 
Regulator/ researcher 
2008 J Du Plessis Transvaal High 
Court Judgement. 
Litigation by 6 applicants 
citing 8 respondents 
seeking to set aside the 
rollout of EBTs in Gauteng. 
Anti-
EBT 
“Disguised slots 
machines.” 
Business/competition 
2013 T. Ngobese The blurring of the 
line between 
casino and Bingo. 
Erosion of the line between 
casinos and Bingo has 
caused the two forms of 
gambling to be 
indistinguishable. 
Anti-
EBT 
“Disguised slots 
machines.” 
 
Business/competition 
2014 PAEBT STOP EBT - The 
People's Forum 
Against Electronic 
Bingo Terminals. 
A Facebook lobby page 
against the establishment of 
EBTs in KwaZulu Natal. 
Anti -
EBT 
“EBTs are a slot 
machine’s disguise” 
& negative socio-
economic impact. 
Lobbyists/ societal  
2014 D. Mcpherson DA calls for 
moratorium on 
issuing of EBT 
gambling licenses. 
“Call for the Minister of 
Trade and Industry, to 
institute a national 
moratorium on the issuing 
of licenses relating to 
EBTs”. 
Anti -
EBT 
Disguised slots 
machines/poor 
regulations. 
 
Political 
parties/lobbyists 
2014 D. Mcpherson DA welcomes 
ANC agreement 
to moratorium on 
Bingo Terminal 
gambling licenses. 
 
“Chairperson of the 
Portfolio Committee on 
Trade and Industry, Joan-
mariae Fubbs, (ANC) calls 
for the institution of a 
national moratorium on the 
issuing of licenses for 
electronic Bingo terminals 
(EBTs). 
Anti -
EBT 
The use of EBTs, 
which effectively 
function as slot 
machines, is poorly 
regulated under the 
National Gambling 
Act”. 
Political 
parties/lobbyists 
2015 Amil Umraw Moratorium 
placed on Bingo 
terminals ‘hard’ 
gambling 
opportunity. 
More than 300 community 
members lodged a petition 
opposing the offering of 
EBTs at a local shopping 
mall. 
Anti-
EBT 
Socio-economic 
impact on an 
already 
impoverished 
community. 
Societal/civics 
2016 T. van Aardt Casino bid to shut 
down Bingo halls 
comes under fire. 
Bingo Association defence 
of a Bingo operator against 
a challenge by a casino. 
Pro- 
EBT 
Arguments that the 
casino blames its 
misfortunes on 
Bingo instead of 
looking at its 
business model. 
Business/competition 
2016 Cape 
Messenger 
Electronic Bingo 
terminals 
challenged. 
A casino in the Eastern 
Cape lodged court action 
challenging the use of 
electronic Bingo terminals.  
Anti-
EBT 
Disguised slots 
machines creating 
“mini casinos”. 
Business/competition 
Source: Personal collection  
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4.10.5 Regulator’s processes – post product submission 
 
The documents reviewed especially internal reports show the following processes undertaken 
by the regulator: 
Process 1: Clarification 
• The regulator invited the PO to demonstrate the product, explain its intended use 
and respond to questions that may arise. 
Process 2: Collaboration 
 
• Other public regulators who were not originally affected by the submission were 
also invited to observe the demonstration as per Process 1 above, ask questions and 
provide inputs. 
Process 3: Research  
 
• The regulator embarked on a process of research whereby various other regulators 
within South Africa and internationally were consulted for inputs. The research 
also included a visit to Gauteng which was the only jurisdiction to have currently 
approved and operating a variety of the product. 
Process 4: Review & analysis  
 
• The applicable legislative prescripts governing such products i.e. the provincial 
gambling act, national act, technical standards, the regulations and rules were 
considered. 
4.10.6 Regulator’s findings and conclusions  
From the research conducted and the analysis of various inputs, the regulator found that:  
Finding 1: Insufficient/inappropriate test conducted 
• The product was not tested against the appropriate technical standards, national or 
provincial legislation, in that it presented a form of a server based gambling solution. 
However, it was tested only against standards for non-server based casino product.  
 
• The testing of the product against standards for casino equipment was considered 
inappropriate since it did not attest to its functionality in the Bingo market where it was 
intended to operate. 
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Finding 2: No technical standards in existence 
 
• At the time of the submission, there were no published standards for server based 
gambling hence products of such a nature were not approved and allowed for 
consumption by the public. 
Finding 3: No interoperability testing  
 
• The product was not tested for compatibility and interoperability with currently 
approved CMS’ which thus raised concerns regarding the monitoring and accounting 
of the Bingo product.  
Finding 4: Close resemblance to casino gambling machines 
 
• The product resembled casino gambling machine too closely, such that it was difficult 
to differentiate them. It also offered the same types of games found in casinos with their 
respective styles of play.  
Finding 5: Ongoing litigation 
 
• At the time of its submission in Mpumalanga, the product was already approved for use 
in Gauteng by the Gauteng Regulator. However, such approval was subject to a court 
challenge by at least six casino operators in that province. As such, the MGB thought 
it would be prudent not to approve it pending the court action (Finding 6). 
 
Regulator’s conclusion 
Accordingly, the manufacturer of the product was informed that the application for approval 
of the EBT is not successful and the regulators findings were provided as the basis for its 
rejection. Upon receipt of the outcome, the PO fundamentally repudiated the regulators reasons 
for declining the approval. 
4.10.7 Contribution of other parties regarding the product 
4.10.7.1 Industry stakeholders 
Evidence of contribution by other parties was found in the documents submitted to the 
regulator. These parties also made observations regarding the product directly and indirectly. 
Some of the inputs, especially those from casinos and other manufacturers of similar or related 
products, were unsolicited but provided nevertheless, seemingly to protect existing business 
interests. Some of the submissions in the reviewed documents were as follows: 
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
66 
i) The NGB recommended a moratorium to the further licensing and roll-out of the 
product by all provinces pending investigations to be conducted by the National 
Gambling Policy Council. In this regard, it was envisaged that the investigation will 
seek to determine the impact and nature of the EBTs within the National Gambling Act 
and other policy considerations. 
 
ii) The provincial regulator in Gauteng, which had already licenced the EBT, provided its 
background and rationale behind the licensing of such product. It argued that it found 
the product suitable for approval and use within its province and that all legislative 
requirements were appropriately satisfied. 
 
iii) Casinos and competing manufacturers also argued against the licensing of a product 
on the basis that it does not meet the criteria set in legislation for such products hence 
its licensing was unlawful. Furthermore, the objections were on the basis of it being 
an unfair competition, which circumvents existing legislative requirements. 
4.10.7.2 Information arising from litigation 
Litigation by existing stakeholders in the industry which for competitive reasons was aimed at 
preventing the further rollout of the EBT product provided further insights on how independent 
parties view the product. In this regard, judge du Plessis of the High Court, Transvaal 
Provincial Division (Du Plessis, 2008, p.3) found and ruled that: 
i) The game and its product were markedly identical to existing slot games and machines 
currently found in licensed casino, therefore the game played is not the game of Bingo. 
ii) The alternate contention in this regard was that if the game played is indeed the game 
of Bingo, such was not played in accordance with the approved rules of the game. 
iii) There was insufficient and no appropriate legislative and regulatory framework to 
approve and regulate the EBT devices and the games played therein. 
iv) The lack of testing standards to test the product to ensure its fairness, accuracy and 
auditability thereby protecting revenues and the players. 
v) It was suspected that the game fails to yield the minimum return to players required 
in terms of legislation. 
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4.10.8 Product diffusion enablers and inhibitors 
From the POs submission, industry opinions, regulators’ and Court findings or conclusions 
various enablers (EDs) and inhibitors (IDs) of approval and diffusion of the EBT product, are 
summarised and classified as follows: 
Table 7: Product diffusion enablers, and inhibitors 
 Decision value (DV) ED ID Source(s) DV Type 
1. Incorrect standards used to 
test. 
No Yes MGB; High 
Court. 
Codification. 
2. Lack of interoperability 
testing. 
No Yes MGB; High 
Court. 
PO non-compliance. 
3. Sector ambiguity. No Yes MGB; High 
Court. 
Codification. 
4. Insufficient regulatory 
framework. 
No Yes MGB; High 
Court. 
Abstraction/codification. 
5. Insufficient regulatory 
framework. 
Yes No PO; GGB. Obfuscation/interpretation. 
6. Below required RTP. No Yes High Court. PO non-compliance. 
7. Compliance with minimum 
regulatory framework. 
Yes No PO; GGB. Obfuscation/interpretation. 
8. No requirement for 
interoperability tests. 
Yes No PO. Obfuscation/interpretation. 
Source: Personal collection 
4.11 Chapter conclusions 
The organisational data gleaned from the MGB has shown the organisation’s inclination 
towards knowledge work with a high degree of knowledge intensity. Ultimately, it is the central 
point where an overall perspective of the industry can be found through careful mining of the 
data it collects, analyses and stores. The way the regulator is organised, its processes, and 
emphasis on further training and autonomy of its employees supports the case of recognising 
the company as a high-end knowledge development institution. Accordingly, its employees 
also view themselves as key contributors to the knowledge development processes based on 
their activities in the evaluation of new products such as the EBTs.  
Finally, the model product highlighted in specific terms the contribution of the regulator into 
the EBT product and pointed towards attributes that are of benefit to it, which were not included 
in the original submission by the PO. The next Chapter considers these observations and 
provides their analysis against applicable knowledge management literature.   
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Chapter 5 – Discussion of the empirical observations 
 
5.1 Regulator’s knowledge posture  
5.1.1 Knowledge intensity and autonomy 
Since the model regulator (MGB) deals primarily with intangibles, Alvesson (2004, p.17) cited 
in Newell et al (2009, p.31) would classify the organisation as a Professional Services Firm 
(PSF). As such, it will be typically expected to deal with its clients directly, as it currently does. 
Depending on its size, it is expected to organise as a professional bureaucracy with traditional 
hierarchical lines or Managed Professional Bureaucracy (MPB), with recognised codes of 
practices and clearly defined career paths (Newell et al., 2009, p.30).  
The regulator mostly fits the description of a PSF-MPB, mainly due to the large variety of 
professionals it employs, the absence of a distinct code of ethics, requirement for professional 
affiliation and specific educational requirements which restrict entry. The basis of describing 
it as a PSF-MPB is likely a result of the posture of the gambling industry, which is a fusion of 
diverse professions working as a system to achieve a desired goal. Professionals such as 
accountants, lawyers, IT specialist, food and beverage, and hospitality personnel are all almost 
equally important for the successful functioning of the industry.  
The senior and operational managers of the regulator, however, are currently comprised mainly 
of accounting professionals such as auditors and financial personnel. For instance, of the six 
executive managers (see Figure 9) at the MGB, four are accountants and the other two are legal 
and IT professionals. These are in line with the minimum requirements of the positions. It 
therefore follows that many the production workers are also professionals in the accounting, 
legal and IT professions. Some diversity of the professionals is, however, prevalent in the 
compliance department, which contain former gambling industry professionals trained in 
various fields such as IT, technical operations and law enforcement. 
True to Newell et al’s. (2009, p.53) prescripts for knowledge intensive firms, the organisation 
heavily relies on its workforce for competitive advantage. The organisation recognises this and 
mentions its employees as part of its strengths in its internal analysis (MGB, 2015, p 61).  
Autonomy is mostly evident in the compliance department, which comprises most of the 
esoteric skills specific to the gambling industry. In this regard, the employees mainly set the 
agenda regarding areas of evaluation, frequency, and specific areas of focus within the 
legislative confines governing the institution. For the other departments autonomy is inhibited 
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by the nature of the work. For example, once a license application is submitted, it must comply 
with very specific legislative requirements, thus leaving very little scope for creativity in 
problem solving and organising. 
5.1.2 Regulator’s knowledge positioning 
Regulators are often typified as knowledge exploiters and less as explorers of knowledge (see 
Newell et al., 2009,231, Boisot, 2008, p,34). These hypotheses position regulatory firms as 
consumers of already created knowledge without any real expectation of knowledge production 
on their part. But this claim does not sufficiently appreciate that once knowledge has been 
created and diffused, there is always scope for secondary knowledge creation upon the 
presented knowledge product.   
The secondary knowledge creation space is probably the realm of public regulators who, by 
the nature of their composition, are not encumbered with knowledge creation expectations. 
Augmenting existing products is where they are positioned. However, like the primary 
knowledge creation that brings a product into existence, augmentation also requires knowledge 
creation. From the empirical data gleaned from the MGB and the model product, clearly the 
regulator views a role beyond just passively consuming and exploiting created knowledge.  
Looking at its mission i.e. “to be at the forefront of effective gambling regulation of the 
gambling industry”, and its objectives of co-operation, research, and rendering advice to 
government, all require and imply a knowledge exploration rather than exploitation posture.  
Being at the “forefront” of the whole industry, as its vision sates, behoves the organisation 
pursuing such a strategy to explore alternative or novel ways of regulating that are not currently 
being used by other comparable regulators. This requires knowledge creation, which is 
exploration. Firstly, it must know and understand the issues in the industry and the existing 
regulatory approaches and devise better and new ways of doing such. For example, the creation 
of a completely new category of a licence or the regulation of a new product that was not 
regulated before. In such regards, knowledge must be created, therefore innovation must occur.  
Furthermore, the regulators’ objective of co-operation, research and rendering advice to 
government cannot be effectively fulfilled without an effort and attempt at knowledge creation. 
It is good and well for an organisation conceptually created and modelled to be a knowledge 
exploiter, such as regulators, to have strategic ambitions related to knowledge exploration and 
according to literature, more suitable for knowledge exploiters. It is also perhaps naivety, 
arrogance, ignorance, or all of this, for such organisations to even consider including these 
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“lofty” and unorthodox ambitions in their strategic postures and objectives. However, the 
empirical evidence suggests that the regulator does not think of itself as a mere consumer of 
new knowledge and products. Instead, it thinks and models itself as an active participant in the 
knowledge development process, hence the constant preparedness through the way it is 
organised and supported by the perpetual training and education of its people. 
5.2 Regulator’s knowledge processes 
5.2.1 Inter, and intra-organisational knowledge issues 
There are various inter and intra-organisational contextual issues that either enable or inhibit 
knowledge work. Amongst these, Newell et al. (2009, p.240) identifies culture, diversity, 
autonomy and shared perspectives as key knowledge enablers.  
As evident from the empirical findings, the successful diffusion of knowledge products demand 
inter, and intra-organisational context amongst the organisations involved in the process. 
Within the submitting organisation, referred to as the PO in this regard, a culture of knowledge 
work must prevail. For example, trust, autonomy, and diversity must be a staple phenomenon. 
This will thus be evident in the products that the organisation creates, in the form of their 
diversity, uniqueness, and the frequency within which they are presented for diffusion. These 
conditions must be prevalent at the regulating organisation, which will provide the necessary 
wherewithal to expertly evaluate the POs products and take well-reasoned and articulated 
decisions.  
Over and above the internal contexts within the POs and the regulator, there must be a 
knowledge-work friendly inter-organisational context. For instance, both organisational 
contexts must encompass diversity, autonomy and shared perspectives, amongst other 
requirements. Discrepancies in the knowledge contexts between the PO and the regulator will 
most likely frustrate the product diffusion efforts of the one and the regulation efforts of the 
other. As an illustration, a PO that is too far ahead of the regulator, which it is subject to whose 
authority, risks frequent rejection of its product diffusion efforts by such a regulator due to the 
latter being left too far behind in the innovation process. Therefore, such POs risk wasting 
R&D resources and inhibited growth.  
Similarly, the regulator should also not be too far ahead or behind the PO in terms of readiness 
to assess new products submitted by the former for diffusion. The relationship between the two 
organisations is therefore symbiotic and a culture of constant inter-organisational knowledge 
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sharing is required. Both parties must always be transparent and engaging on developments on 
either side and this requires a context of trust.  
The circumstances around the EBT suggest disparities between the PO and the regulator in 
terms of the expected or allowable functionality of the product. Hence, this may be an 
indication of deficiencies in the inter-organisational relationship between the parties. However, 
for reasons of competitive advantage and market share, it is expected of POs to test, and where 
possible, push the limits. The POs submission, in this regard, railroaded the regulator to initiate 
a process of knowledge creation, sharing and codification about the model product. As an 
example, the regulator’s request for a demonstrative presentation (Process-1) was aimed at 
identifying features of the product and the subliminal tacit knowledge and issues about it that 
are necessary but not included in the POs submission. Process-1 was initiated because the 
regulator had to evaluate an unfamiliar product. 
5.2.2 Knowledge creation context-issues 
As shown by the empirical data, regulators do not typically request POs to demonstrate and 
field questions about a product when it is presented. Following on Nonaka’s (1994) SECI 
model cited in Newell et al. (2009, p.8), the demonstrative presentation was on the surface an 
act of socialisation. In this regard, tacit-tacit knowledge conversion occurred during the 
interaction between the PO, the model regulator and other regulators present during the 
presentation of the product. By bringing all the parties together, the regulator created the 
enabling context propagated by Nonaka (1994) for the concerned individuals to “create and 
share knowledge” about the model product.  
This individual, inter and intra-organisational knowledge sharing was unlikely without the 
model regulator’s insistence. Had the model regulator opted to just interact with the 
documentary submission, the wider socialisation hence tacit-tacit knowledge conversion would 
not have happened. The aim of the regulator in this regard, ultimately, was externalisation of 
the knowledge about the product that was gleaned during the socialisation process.  
5.2.3 Issues of collaboration 
From the socialisation efforts of the regulator, the evaluation of the product became a multi-
faceted collaborative effort (Process-2). As the empirical evidence shows, unsolicited inputs 
and observations about the product were received from parties which were not seen to be 
related with or affected by the product.  As evidenced by the various challenges faced by the 
product later in the diffusion process, its evaluation required a diversity of views from within 
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the gambling industry, civil society, and the legislative bodies. These inputs proved pertinent 
in the evaluation and the subsequent decision of the regulator about the product.  
The latter processes of the regulator (Process-4 & 5), i.e. research, and the consideration of the 
legislative requirements complemented the socialisation and externalisation processes already 
initiated, and served to enrich the knowledge created for and about the product. 
All the regulator’s processes (Process-1 – 5) yielded valuable additional knowledge about the 
product which would have otherwise not come light. Primarily, these processes produced the 
regulator’s findings and conclusions about the product (Findings-1 – 5). Secondly the POs 
views and rationales about its product which would be unknown if the regulator did not provide 
the avenue for discussing it, came to light. Lastly, the regulator’s processes inspired other 
parties to provide their views on the product.  
5.3. Analysis of interviews  
5.3.1 Processes and knowledge intensity  
The respondents highlighted results from tests conducted on new products as a key source and 
basis of new knowledge, which is critical in decisions on whether to approve, decline or rescind 
an already approved product. As such, the respondents indicated that tests were, and continue 
to be, conducted on the EBT product pre and post-diffusion and that this is not unique to this 
product. The autonomy provided by the environment at the regulator allows the production 
workers and the operations managers to design these tests and tailor them to address specific 
areas identified for particular products, such as the EBT. Further to meeting the specific 
requirements by the subject of the tests, two of the respondents indicated that testing highlights 
legislative inadequacies, which are later presented to the regulator for possible amendments. 
Instances where legislation was influenced by the respondents were highlighted.  
The respondents’ perspectives on knowledge intensity, types of training required and the 
processes followed in the evaluation of products were similar in many respects. They all 
indicated an internally articulating layered process which starts from the production worker, in 
this case an inspector, who performs the initial evaluation and the prerequisite checks for 
completeness and correctness of the product’s submission. The outcome at this stage is 
preliminary opinion intended for internal consideration by the operations manager. The 
manager also performs an evaluation on the product and the work already done by the inspector, 
but this is mainly a quality control verification. As an outcome at this stage, the operations 
manager may refer the evaluation back to the inspector, and direct a re-evaluation, further tests 
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and/or experiments on the product.  If the operations manager is satisfied with the evaluation 
of the product by the lower level worker, this is as good as a “soft approval” of the product that 
is awaiting executive signoff. Whilst questions for clarity and other relevant requests may be 
advance to the PO, none of the “soft findings” are externalised until official executive sign off.  
 
The multi-layered and articulating evaluation process within the regulator serves many 
purposes, chief amongst those being the minimisation of errors in the evaluation and the 
approval. Such has collaboration, teamwork and knowledge sharing embedded in it, in that the 
ultimate decision on whether the product is approved or rejected must, and will, contain inputs 
from the inspector, operations and the executive level management. Ultimately, all three levels 
of evaluation are accountable for the decision to approve or reject the product. Knowledge 
development therefore thrives under these circumstances, since the collective accountability 
compels and ultimately induces a relationship of engagement through debates, trust and inter-
reliance amongst the evaluation and approval cohort. 
 
Thus, it is to be expected that the respondents understanding of the processes of evaluation 
were uniform regardless of the position they occupy. Because these processes were created and 
refined by the regulator over the years, it can be inferred that the regulator was successful in 
communicating and embodying them to its employees. In the first instance, the regulator 
determined the level of skills required after processes of job-grading and evaluation. Further, 
it was the same regulator who determined the appropriate levels of compliance from products 
requiring approval in its jurisdiction.  
The respondents, as the regulator’s employees, were employed because they were seen to meet 
the regulator’s requirements thus perceived as able to execute the regulator’s mandate. As a 
knowledge intensive firm and a system, the understanding of the processes and requirements 
of a project are some of the basic requirements for successful knowledge development. This is 
seemingly prevalent at the regulator as demonstrated by the respondents.  
5.3.2 Deficiencies in process and knowledge intensity  
Despite the uniformity of the responses on the issues of process, there were deficiencies in the 
overall knowledge development process for the evaluation and approval of products. These 
were gleaned mainly from the responses of the production worker and the inspector, but not so 
much from the operations managers.  
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The inspector respondent intimated that the higher-level executives, who ultimately approve or 
reject product submissions, do not possess sufficient technical knowledge about such products, 
hence the specific value of their contribution is inconsequential. The executive management 
cohort of the regulator is comprised mainly of accountants and some IT and a legal 
professional. However, their technical knowledge on the evaluation of gambling products, such 
as the EBT, is rudimentary at best. Primarily, the expert technical evaluation and analysis of 
the products is carried out by the operations manager and the inspector, hence if the frontline 
evaluators are satisfied it is highly likely that the product will meet executive approval. As 
such, the evaluation of the product at executive level, which is the level that decides the 
diffusion fate of the product hence the most powerful, is largely ceremonial. 
 
In Figure 12, the knowledge input of the different levels of evaluation is indicated and 
contrasted against their formal power. Knowledge input was considered against the role of the 
position in the evaluation, whilst formal power refers to the impact of the decision on the 
diffusion trajectory of the product. 
 
 Figure 12: Knowledge input & formal power 
Source: Personal collection 
The incumbent at the executive level is authorised by the position they hold to speak about 
products submitted for evaluation at the formal structures, conferences and various platforms. 
Contrarily, the production workers and the operations managers are typically not part of such 
forums, or in cases where they are, they attend as invitees and only contribute to discussions if 
requested. Consequently, much of the power is concentrated at the executive level, yet it has 
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the least knowledge contribution which seems ironic and to an extent a missed opportunity for 
the further development of relevant knowledge about and for the product.  
5.3.3 Project work and collaboration 
In explaining the nature of their work, regardless of whether it is production or operations 
management, all three respondents emphasised the project nature of the work. Many of the 
tasks involved have a defined starting and end point. In respect of new products, the projects 
begin when these are submitted and the evaluation process ensues, and they end when a 
recommendation or decision is taken on the project. The respondents highlighted different 
starting and ending points. For the production worker (inspector) and operations managers, the 
project ends when they make recommendations, whilst for the regulator it ends when the 
decision about the product is communicated to the PO.  
Regarding collaboration, the respondents emphasised its importance and called for more 
regular interaction amongst all stakeholders in the industry. The collaboration efforts of the 
MGB in the evaluation of the EBT were generally noted as a positive aspect and an important 
ingredient for knowledge development. The importance of collaboration was also highlighted 
by the adoption of CMS requirements by the other regulators after noting its benefits from first 
movers such as the MGB.  
5.3.4 Regulatory stringency and innovation posture 
Regulatory stringency or flexibility, can, according to Stewart (2010, pp.4-5), determine the 
cost burden of compliance and the probability of dud innovations. Regarding stringency in 
particular, Ashford et al. (1985, p.426) cited in Stewart (2010, p.5), states that this is the most 
important factor influencing technological innovation. Accordingly, the posture of the 
regulator towards innovations was probed to determine stringency and flexibility of its 
approach. As such, the statement “regulators are generally regarded as inhibitors of 
innovations due to their bureaucratic postures and perceived lack of knowledge and interest in 
innovation” was put to the respondents.  
In broad terms, the respondents viewed theirs as a crucial role in the process which must be 
maintained.  This position was mainly taken from a social welfare and integrity point of view 
and a general antitrust perception of the product manufacturers and ultimately the operators. 
Simply put, the manufacturers and operators should not be entrusted with the responsibility of 
social welfare friendly products, hence the regulator must stay alert.  
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Accordingly, the respondents viewed the current processes as insufficient and too flexible, 
which favours the manufacturer. This thus allows a high degree and turnover of new products, 
which leaves the regulators too far behind in the regulation spectrum. As such, the respondents 
were of the view that the regulators are mainly reactive in their approach and do not initiate 
regulations that promote innovation. However, the respondents recognised and highlighted that 
the regulators only must create an environment conducive to innovation and do not necessarily 
have to create the products themselves.  
Also, the respondents saw regulations favourable to innovation as a weakness in the legislative 
framework, which must be tightened to ensure that products such as the EBTs do not find space 
in a regulated environment, unless and until regulations explicitly call for such. One of the 
respondents therefore preferred a zero-tolerance approach to products that are not sufficiently 
clarified in regulations or products that exhibit traits of non-compliance with existing 
requirements. Comparisons were thus drawn with similar regulators in the country, and the 
respondents opined that the stringency of the regulation and the evaluation process must be 
adopted by all gambling jurisdictions in the country to ensure uniformity and social welfare on 
a national scale.   
The views around regulatory stringency and flexibility are subjective based on the holders’ role 
in the innovation equation. Proponents of social welfare, such as regulators, always consider 
the latest threats to the integrity of products, whilst private sector capitalists are more concerned 
about increasing market handle through novel products. Of importance to the innovators is the 
degree of change required to innovate and yet remain compliant with the regulations. In this 
regard, Stewart (2010, p.5) opines that innovators will take the innovation route that requires 
minimal compliance, thus cost effective.  
 
The least costly route does not always yield the most innovative product, thus potentially and 
inadvertently stifle innovation. Similarly, the stringency of the regulation may cause the 
innovator to intensify the innovation process by going beyond the orthodox processes. 
Therefore, whilst the interests of the regulator are equally important, the stringency of the 
regulation proposed by the respondents must be cognisant of the impact of such on the 
manufacturers so that the interests of both are balanced. The regulator must therefore consider 
if gradual or disruptive introduction of the stringent requirements is appropriate. 
5.3.5 Regulator’s contribution to products 
Accordingly, the respondents were of the view that the regulator makes a significant 
contribution to the products, and highlighted that such a contribution is often not recognisable 
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due to perceptions in the industry about the role of regulators in the process. The respondents 
all provided specific examples of areas where the regulators’ contribution is mostly notable. 
Regarding this aspect, the operations managers highlighted the inclusion of CMS as part of the 
products’ attributes and operational requirements as the most apparent of the regulator’s 
contribution.  
The PO initially did not intend for this functionality, however, the regulators pointed out the 
benefits of having such for the product owner, operators and the regulator. Amongst the 
benefits of the inclusion of the CMS as part of the product, one of the respondents highlighted 
the skills development aspect particularly for the operators and its staff. Without the CMS, the 
EBT did not provide the analytical tools required to understand the operations of the Bingo 
business, as such the introduction of the CMS provided these tools. However, to operate this 
additional tool, navigate through its functionality and to maintain it, additional skills had to be 
developed at the operator’s level which was duly done.  
Despite the success and achievements in the evaluation process, the respondents highlighted 
issues that inhibited the effective evaluation of the EBT and other products submitted. In the 
main, the high volume of submissions was regarded as a major factor that compromises the 
quality of the evaluation. Furthermore, whilst they all generally agreed and felt that they are 
adequately skilled to evaluate the product, the respondents all submitted that they are always 
at least one step behind the private sector POs in respect of the new products and innovation.  
5.4 The model product - EBT 
5.4.1 The model product through Boisot’s lens 
Products that yield sustained competitive advantage are sometimes found in the most obvious 
of places, but to uncover them a certain type of knowledge and skills are required. Not 
everybody or firm possess such know-how. Appropriately so, Boisot (1998) proffers that 
“products communicate more than what they were designed and sometimes say a lot more 
about the organisation or person that brought them to being”. Boisot thus implies that a lot 
more than what is explicit can be learnt about an organisation through the products it produces.  
The EBT as a product of knowledge development is an apt embodiment of the point about 
gambling being a business of knowledge and information. In totality, it represents a certain 
level of knowledge embedding. The PO used existing knowledge assets as contained in the 
three dimensions that Boisot (1998) describes, i.e. knowledge in people’s heads, documents, 
and artefacts. In its disaggregated form, the EBT product provides some useful insights about 
the discovery, creation and application of knowledge.  
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Following on Boisot’s I-space analogy, the manufacturer of the EBT fused existing Bingo 
(traditional/manual) with existing products i.e. the game of Bingo and casino games (already 
successful) to bring it to being. The game of Bingo is played in most countries the world over, 
therefore can be said to be highly codified, abstracted, and diffused. 
Being available and played in different countries means that it has been adapted to a wide range 
of contexts, languages and cultures. This high codification aspect of the game stems from the 
fact that knowledge surrounding it has largely been captured through various means; and 
instructions on how it is played are widely available in all sorts of mediums e.g. books, 
pamphlets, magazines, the internet amongst other forms. It is so widely played and ubiquitous 
in gaming and non-gambling circles that knowledge regarding it can be considered as already 
embrained and embodied in people’s heads. This to the extent that the manuals and instructions 
are no longer necessary in some respects.  
Although the game is essentially a gambling game, therefore ordinarily expected in a gambling 
environment, its high levels of abstraction has made it applicable and played in a diverse range 
of sectors and circumstances. As an example, it is used and played in social settings for fun, in 
Bingo halls purely for-profit purposes, amongst others. Even religious organisations, who are 
ordinarily opposed to gambling, are known to be using the game to supplement their income 
from bequests and other donations.  
The levels of its diffusion can thus be attested by the game’s availability to agents who wish to 
use the knowledge about it. And, in this regard, the statistics about the uptake and popularity 
of the game of Bingo vary amongst the available sources.  The number of Bingo players is 
estimated at over 100 million people worldwide, therefore, the obvious consensus is that 
amongst the potential Bingo audience or consumers the diffusion and even uptake is high 
(Snowden, 2016).  
5.4.2 Schumpeterian (S) learning dimensions of Bingo 
Bingo is over 600 years old, therefore, its advancement to the highest possible levels of the I-
space are expected. In Neoclassical descriptive terms, the current wide diffusion and adoption 
of the game could be credited to the cumulative elimination of errors and clarification of fuzzy 
areas in its early years (Bosiot 1998, p.99). As an example, at its early implementation for a 
church fundraising in Pennsylvania, USA, it was detected that the game produced more 
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winners, thus making it financially unattractive. To correct this, more number combinations 
were developed, thus keeping it interesting and profitable (Snowden, 2016).  
As Boisot puts it, through perpetual error detection and correction the knowledge about Bingo 
has been objectively verified and accepted albeit at the expense of it becoming inert. It is the 
possibility of such states of inertia that provided the owner of the EBT version of the game 
with the platform to launch a new knowledge product (EBT). According to Boisot, having 
reached the state of inertia, knowledge and hence products based on such become reliable and 
provide a solid supporting foundation for further learning, thus further knowledge creation and 
development (Boisot, 1998, p.97). Since knowledge is based on memory (Weick, 1995: p.5) 
and its usage is economised through experience, therefore, Bingo as a game provided a memory 
and experience base for the EBT as a knowledge product.   
The second dimension of inert knowledge such as the Bingo game, as Boisot (1998) puts it, is 
the embeddedness of the foundational errors in such knowledge which must thus be carried 
over and built upon when new knowledge and products are developed further. About to the 
Bingo game, such was played using specific rules, requirements and products. For any 
improvements or variations of the game to claim the use of the Bingo name, it had to retain the 
use of some of the original requirements. These constitute the equivalent of the difficult 
foundational errors, which cause discontinuous knowledge creation and application for 
knowledge products later.  
As an example, for EBTs to be considered as a game of Bingo, the element of multiple 
participants which stems from the original social character of the game had to be retained and 
built into the EBT. The implications herein are that the playing of the EBT game must be 
delayed until two or more players participate in the play. Again, this was necessary for the 
social interactions enforced by the Bingo game in its early stages, and highly desirable in 
church fundraisers or interactions in pubs on a Friday night, for example. However, for the 
pure gambling profit making sense where the interaction is between the player and the EBT 
product, the social interaction is loathed by players and operators alike. But it had to be built 
in for the game to stake any claim of being a game of Bingo albeit in an electronic sense.  
If the Bingo to EBT evolution is to be analysed in Schumpeterian learning terms, the arguments 
would stem from the philosophical ontology that all products, thus all knowledge, regardless 
of their positioning in the I-space, are hypothesis thus subject to repudiation or validation. By 
building on an existing widely accepted, used and by all accounts successful knowledge 
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product, the submitter seeks to validate, repudiate and or improve on the knowledge base of 
the product. 
5.4.3 The model product and the codification conundrum  
From the myriad of concerns engrossing the product as shown in the empirical findings, it is 
reasonable to conclude that some of the issues associated with it were mainly codification and 
abstraction related. As per Boisot (1998, p.84), fuzzy codification and abstraction schemes are 
to be expected from emergent technologies, such as this model product, since they are typically 
unstructured. For instance, incorrect standards were used for testing since there were no 
available standards applicable to the product, therefore, the next available standard was the 
casino’s which was thus used. However, the use of the casino products’ standard led to the 
sector ambiguity regarding the product which exacerbated the codification concern.  
The regulators and the industry were thus grappling mainly with, first, in which of the legislated 
and authorised gambling categories and sectors to place the product. Secondarily, was the 
product suitable as a Bingo game belonging to Bingo halls or was it casino related and to be 
placed in casinos? Alternatively, was it a completely new product requiring a fresh code or 
classification?  
Boisot (1998, p.44) terms codification as the act of “creating conceptual categories that 
facilitate the classification of phenomena” through a process known as coding. When the EBT 
was submitted for approval, generic conceptual categories described by Boisot (1998) were 
already in existence and fully functional in the gambling industry. These consisted of Casinos, 
LPMs, Horse Racing & Betting and Bingo (contentiously, in its traditional form).  
As such, in their evaluation of new products, regulators and the other gambling industry 
stakeholders affected, in general first attempt to assign the product/phenomena in the existing 
broad industry classes. Then, within those classes, further subclasses and categories are applied 
to serve as a guide on the appropriate evaluation criteria to be used. Boisot (1998, p.44) notes 
that a high number of codification choices and classes increases the complexity of the 
codification task, which thus becomes time consuming.  
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Figure 13: Codification of gambling sectors and products 
Source: Personal collection 
The codification uncertainty around the product presented a time-consuming complex problem 
which thus extended its evaluation time hence its approval for diffusion. As shown earlier, the 
MGB and other regulators generally require the submission of administrative paperwork 
associated with a product for it its evaluation. But, for this product more extensive research 
including a demonstrative presentation was required to discern what it is, where does it belong 
and whether it can be approved or not. Even in its response to the PO, the regulator cited 
codification related reasons for its rejection such as the testing against inappropriate standards, 
the absence of appropriate standards to test it, its encroachment on features attributable to 
products categories such as casino products (see Finding 1 – 5).  
Boisot (1998, p. 43) states that, tasks, in this case products, that are less codified require a 
greater amount of data processing thus time consuming and highly complex and laden with 
uncertainty. Our model product supports Boisot’s thesis in many fronts, for example, the 
product was first submitted for approval by the regulator in 2006, yet it was only approved and 
allowed for use in 2011. Typically, the lead times for approval of products in Mpumalanga and 
various other gambling jurisdictions is at least one week on average. This is possible mainly 
because the products submitted are usually adequately codified according to the appropriate 
gambling sector and tested against the relevant standards. 
Furthermore, the fuzzy codification scheme of the product delayed its approval and rollout in 
other provinces in South Africa, whilst for adequately codified products, POs typically deploy 
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these simultaneously in all the nine provinces. For a long time (2006 – 2011), Gauteng and 
Mpumalanga were the only provinces where the EBT product was approved. Other provinces 
followed much later on after the product had settled into a codification scheme.  
5.4.4 Chapter conclusions 
A high level of knowledge intensity and autonomy in certain departments of the organisation 
was highlighted in this Chapter and analysed against KM principles espoused in Newell et al. 
(2009). The analysis against the KM principles led to the classification of the organisation as a 
PSF-MBP because of the assortment of skills it requires and employs to fulfil its mandate. As 
a PSF-MBP, the Chapter highlighted the traditional hierarchical lines of organising its 
resources and activities. Accordingly, it became clear that the organisation derives competitive 
advantage mainly from its employees whom it aptly recognises as one of its key assets. 
Regarding its knowledge posture, the empirical analysis shows that the regulator positions itself 
for both knowledge exploration and exploitation; rather than the typical posture of exploitation 
which is ordinarily associated with such organisations.  
In terms of the processes that lead to knowledge development for innovation, various inter and 
intra-organisational issues that either inhibit or enable knowledge work were identified. In the 
main, culture and diversity largely stood out as key considerations. Analysis of the interviews 
in particular, highlighted these and other inhibitors and enablers. Potential inhibitors were 
noted from the inclination of one of the interviewees towards a more stringent approach which 
stifles innovation in some respects. Further deficiencies in the knowledge development process 
related to the amount of power vested in high level executives even though their technical 
contribution into products was viewed as inconsequential. On the enabling side, issues of 
collaboration and a conducive context for knowledge development were noted and analysed.  
Leaning on the enabling and inhibiting factors, the regulators’ contribution was distinguishable 
from the original product attributes. Accordingly, a detailed discussion of the regulator’s 
contribution will be undertaken in Chapter 6. The totality of the empirical analysis, was put 
into Boisot’s (1998) and Schumpeter frameworks.  
  
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
83 
Chapter 6: Conclusions 
6.1 Current position 
As at March 2017, there are two Bingo halls in Mpumalanga operating entirely on the EBT 
format and platform of the Bingo game. A further 8 Bingo licences have been issued by the 
regulator and the license holders are preparing for the rollout of further Bingo sites. Between 
these two Bingo halls about 350 EBT’s are operated. The MGB has, to date approved a further 
160 EBT themes which can thus be readily rolled out on the Bingo floors should this be 
desirable to the operators (MGB Annual Report, 2016). Other POs that were seemingly 
apprehensive of the product have also entered the market with their own design or as providers 
of complimentary Bingo products, e.g. CMS. By all accounts, the product appears to be 
successful and has the wherewithal to independently sustain the Bingo sector of the gambling 
industry. 
6.2 The model regulator’s contribution 
From the empirical observations, finding and the discussion thereof, four significant 
contributory acts attributable to the regulator which have somewhat enhanced the product’s 
prospects of success in the market are identified. There could be many others, but the following 
four have largely stood out and they are: 
6.2.1 Contribution 1: Creating an enabling context  
The importance of the context created by the regulator that enabled further knowledge 
development about the model product is easy to overlook. This is so mainly due to the inclusion 
of many other parties into the knowledge creation process. As observed in the description of 
the product, and the discussions, knowledge development is now perpetual and has brought in 
many other spheres of society. Regulators everywhere in South Africa where they are 
confronted by the submission of the product continue to be the centre of knowledge creation 
and the platform through which the discussions occur.  
For example, public consultations, policy positions, and litigation processes are all channelled 
through the relevant regulator. As a legislative requirement, the relevant regulator must 
consider all such submissions, defend, or support the court actions. These are all knowledge 
intensive endeavours. The internal regulator context must be that of readiness to receive, 
analyse and be conversant in a meaningful manner about the product using different and 
appropriate language. To the public and political principals, the regulator must be able to 
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converse in lay language, whilst a more technically accurate tone is required for industry 
participants. The external context, from the regulator requires factors such as, accessibility, 
fairness, integrity, and transparency amongst others.  
Failure to create and provide a knowledge development friendly context may be regarded as 
failure to execute the core and mandatory strategic commitments, such as “providing advice to 
government”, and protecting the public against unsuitable products. Thence, the regulator 
cannot justify its existence.  
6.2.2 Contribution 2: Clarifying the codification conundrum  
From Boisot’s hypotheses, we know the importance and benefits of high product codification 
particularly the savings in data consumption, and processing, hence time. Therefore, any clarity 
and simplification of the coding of the product is desirable and hugely beneficial to innovators. 
For instance, if an adequate codification scheme existed in 2006 when the product was first 
introduced to the gambling markets in South Africa, the product would have likely been 
approved earlier and diffused to more provinces quicker.  
However, the product only served to increase the complexity of the codification task since it 
did not fit into any of the existing coding schemes. To accommodate it, a new gambling and 
product sub-category had to be created by the regulator within the existing regulatory 
framework.  
To maintain the sought-after Bingo theme desired by the PO, the new sub-category was created 
under the Bingo sector. As such, the existing categories were modified to accommodate it. 
Without the category modification, the product itself had to be adapted to comply and fit into 
the pre-established gambling industry categories. Re-adapting the product to existing 
codification schemes was the less favourable option, therefore the existing Bingo category was 
categorised into “traditional” and “EBT”, whilst previously only one category of Bingo existed. 
Because of the new codification scheme introduced by the regulator, Bingo halls now consist 
of traditional and EBT Bingo products.  
By its approval of the product in 2009, the public regulator also accepted and endorsed the 
codification schemes of the EBT proposed by the PO despite the existent legislative 
shortcomings. Furthermore, since a new coding scheme was created in the broad gambling 
categories it accommodated the EBT within the existing codification schemes, particularly that 
of Bingo thus creating an avenue for this product to compete. The regulator’s actions 
effectively sealed the fate of the product in the gambling industry in a hugely positive way.  
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As noted earlier, the regulator’s view carries the moral and legislative authority on all matters 
relating to gambling, hence products endorsed by it are viewed favourably by the industry and 
the public. Firstly, such products are viewed as safe, fair, and secondly carry the moral license 
of being legal. By saying “this product is a Bingo game, therefore can be used in Bingo halls” 
the codification conundrum was settled at once, hence the product is now operated in Bingo 
halls. Boisot (1998, p.45) notes that once a product has been codified, a “lock in effect” that is 
difficult to reverse over time is thus created.   
Boisot (1998, p.45) notes that, the capability of a firm in persuading the market to accept its 
way of structuring the world and the its way of categorising products likely determines the fate 
of such products in the market, since once the firms proposed codification scheme is accepted, 
it becomes the standard with an “irreversible lock-in effect”.  
Despite the absence of direct legislative and regulatory appropriate fit or category of the 
product, the manufacturer proposed that it will snuggly fit into the Bingo category. Hence, by 
its approval of the product for use in Bingo halls, the regulator agreed with the manufacturer, 
thereby validating its claim about the appropriate coding of the product. Following, the 
approval of the product, the manufacturer was then able to market it as approved by the 
regulator thus paving the way for the EBT to move into the diffusion area of Boisot’s I-space. 
6.2.3 Contribution 3: Negative corrective feedback 
From the empirical data presented, particularly the response of the PO after the regulator 
provided its reasons for declining the approval of the product, it will be naïve or perhaps 
disingenuous to claim or assume that PO did not envisage the rejection of the product by the 
regulator. Earlier empirical evidence shows that the PO has vast experience in designing 
gambling products and has perpetually over the years interacted with regulators. As such, the 
PO is aware of the typical diffusion barriers to products, particularly novel ones such as the 
EBT.  
The available legislated gambling sectors are common cause in the industry, therefore the PO 
was, or ought to have been aware that its product did not exactly fit into any of these of these 
categories. It is also common cause that such products must be tested against the applicable 
standards and the PO was aware that such standards did not exist for this particular product. 
With all this knowledge and experience in mind, why then does the PO continue with 
submission of a product which, given the requirements, is most likely to be rejected than 
approved? Three theses can be advanced from the PO’s insistence on submitting the product 
despite its obvious and fatal shortcomings:  
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i) Although a tangible product was in place, the PO did not envisage it as a complete 
product, hence the submission was part of its development stage, i.e. market testing to 
obtain vital knowledge before the product is rolled out. 
 
ii) Secondly, the PO subscribed to the notion that, the regulator is indeed incompetent 
and lacks the technical capacity to evaluate such a product, therefore it will likely 
approve the diffusion in which case the PO has designed the “perfect product”.  
 
iii) Thirdly, the regulator is indeed competent and likely to conduct a thorough evaluation 
of the product in which case it provides useful feedback that will improve the overall 
product and ensure smooth diffusion in other provinces.  
The three propositions advanced here-above all point towards, a need for further knowledge 
development by the PO, hence the conservative diffusion approach to a single rather than the 
conventional multi-jurisdictional submissions of the product. Seemingly, the PO’s strategy 
was, if the product is approved, then diffusion is proceeded with without delay. Alternatively, 
if the product is not approved, reasons for its failure will be solicited and where possible and 
sensible be co-opted in the administrative and/or technical design of the product. Thirdly, 
where the reasons for rejection are not sensible from a financial and design (administrative and 
technical), the PO will contest and attempt to convince the regulator to accept its propositions 
thereby reducing product design costs and expediting the diffusion process.  
On the surface, declining the approval of the product by the regulator was a setback to the PO 
and the product itself, however, important knowledge about it which later proved to be useful 
for its survival was gleaned. Even though the product was presented as a Bingo conduit, the 
PO was tacitly asking the regulator pertinent strategic questions, for instance whether, such a 
product will be acceptable for use in other markets such as casinos. Secondly, will the casino 
standard nonetheless be acceptable to test it or whether a specific standard must be created for 
this product. Thirdly, the PO also tested the regulator’s attitude towards interoperability testing 
of the product against existing products and which of such products the regulator will require 
the EBT to be tested against. Such knowledge ultimately determines the POs design scope, 
hence a significant event on time and cost of design.  
Since gambling is a regulated environment, the regulator presents a cost effective and faster 
avenue for sourcing the required knowledge and no additional expense is incurred. By 
submitting the product, for evaluation whilst knowing the regulatory challenges it is likely to 
face, the PO effectively and tacitly set the regulator into the path of knowledge exploration. 
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The PO proposed a codification scheme, in the form of an applicable sector and further 
proposed a technical testing criterion in the form casino standards and a regulatory framework 
when it insisted that the product can be regulated through existing legislation. To respond to 
this submission, the regulator could live up to the “incompetence tag” by simply accepting the 
POs proposals on the product or embark on actual knowledge development to provide informed 
resolutions. Either choice is beneficial to the PO and to the product in one way or another.   
When the regulator replied to the PO after extensive research and analysis of the product, it 
answered the tacit questions of codification, standards for testing and interoperability 
requirements. In this regard, the POs proposed codification scheme was not accepted in the 
regulator’s jurisdiction, the standards for testing were insufficient and inappropriate and 
interoperability testing against an appropriately approved monitoring system was compulsory.  
With this knowledge, the PO can thus weigh whether the product can be reasonably modified 
to accommodate these requirements, try to convince the regulators to accept it with the 
shortcomings or create an avenue to correct such.  
Since the regulator in its analysis and research of the product consulted widely within other 
gambling jurisdictions in South Africa and abroad, their reasons for declining approval for the 
product were representative of the likely attitudes of other potential stakeholders regarding 
same.  Therefore, the POs strategic posture regarding the product was influenced by the 
knowledge development endeavours of the regulator. From such information, the PO could 
thus factually assess time and cost of diffusion. Furthermore, by eliminating the diffusion 
inhibitors identified and pointed by the regulator the PO can anticipate these and address them 
before approaching other regulators. The solicitation of a regulator’s response regarding this 
product allowed a codification, abstraction, and diffusion strategies to suggest themselves 
(Boisot; 1998, p.45).  
After all the diffusion barriers have been eliminated, hence approval from the product can be 
thus be marketed to operators and the operators will not be sceptical about its operations since 
the relevant regulator has approved it for use. Unwittingly, the regulator has contributed value 
into the product and rendered such more marketable. Ultimately, the regulator does not, and is 
not entitled to claim any credit for the improved prospects of success for the product.  
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6.2.4 Contribution 4: Creation of a new testing, certification, and approval 
standard 
Notwithstanding the new codification scheme and the creation of a new category of gaming 
within the Bingo halls, the diffusion inhibiting variables such as a lack of legislative framework 
and the appropriate technical standards remained. The remainder of these barriers was a 
creation of the regulator when it rejected the proposed codification and testing schemes by the 
PO in its submissions. As such the options at the regulator’s disposal were binary, such that, it 
could one, totally reject the product based on lack of appropriate legislative framework and 
testing standard, or create such a standard and framework and enable the introduction of 
innovative products. Choosing either of these options is solely the prerogative of the regulator 
guided by its policy postures and whilst POs can make inputs on these, they are not empowered 
to make the decision.  
If the regulator had opted the total rejection route, which it was legally entitled to, this would 
have been a fatal blow to the diffusion of the product. However, the regulator committed 
resources into the development of the appropriate platforms to encourage the diffusion of the 
product. As such, a completely new standard and a general legislative framework governing 
the testing, certification, approval, and operation of the EBT had to be created. These 
frameworks required a great deal of knowledge exploration on the side of the regulator. For 
example, the creation of new technical standard is complex and arduous process which requires 
research and collaboration amongst the industry players and the POs.  
Regulators in this regard, facilitated and ensured the availability of a new technical standard A 
(SABS, 2009) for the testing EBT products and other server-based gaming product that may 
be introduced in future.  The promulgation of a standard for server based gambling systems 
has, simplified the approach to such products in the gambling market and provided the 
necessary blue print for all regulators, POs and operators.  
According to Boisot (1998, p.78) the utility of an information good is partly a function of its 
degree of codification. Therefore, by resolving the codification concerns associated with the 
product through the introduction of a new standard that is applicable to all gaming jurisdictions 
in the country, the regulator improved the utility of the product since it could be now be 
generalised in all provinces.  
Furthermore, the standard ensured well-articulated documentation and descriptions of the 
product, standardised its designs and provided information to POs on what would be the 
acceptable technical operations of the product. Given the clarity provided by the standards, 
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more provinces could thus consider approval of the product and new Bingo operators could 
emerge.  
6.3 Chapter conclusion 
The four key contributions of the regulator from a knowledge development perspective were 
magnified in this chapter and individually analysed. These are; the creation of a context that 
enables knowledge development to thrive; clarification of the codification poser, provision of 
negative corrective feedback to the manufacturer, and the creation of a previously non-existent 
standard for testing, certification and approval of equipment of a similar nature.  
The chapter highlighted the importance of these contributions by the regulator particularly in 
light of the products’ current position, i.e. the creation of value and competitive advantage for 
its owners, the establishment of a new and sustainable gambling market, the creation of jobs 
and the lowering of the entry barriers for new entrants. It is clear from this chapter, the regulator 
laid a solid foundation for future products similar to the EBT to enter the market and to thrive.  
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Chapter 7: Implications for knowledge management 
 
7.1 Epilogue  
 
At the very outset of this thesis, the EBT case emphasised that products that yield competitive 
advantage come about as a result of multiple inputs from diverse stakeholders with differing 
interests. The diversity of the stakeholders ubiquitously includes regulations and regulators. 
From a knowledge development and innovation perspective, the multiplicity of views in the 
development of products, including those of regulators is largely viewed as either a constrain 
or stimulant for knowledge development for innovation.  
 
The theoretical basis of regulation and knowledge development on which the thesis is premised 
was presented in Chapter 2, where dichotomous schools of thought i.e. CET, and the Porter 
Hypothesis were introduced. The CET perspective aligns with the constrain perspective of 
regulation whilst, the Porter Hypothesis regards it as a stimulant of knowledge development, 
hence innovation. Still in Chapter 2, the thesis explained in detail and distinguished the 
concepts of data, information, and knowledge and provided a theoretical basis of these concepts 
based on Boisot (1998) theories of learning which are Neoclassical, and Schumpeterian 
learning perspectives. In Chapter 2, Boisot’s I-space concept was also introduced to show the 
processes leading to the diffusion of products from a theoretical perspective. These theories 
were instrumental in showing the origins of the EBT product and its location in Boisot’s I-
space analytical framework and they featured prominently in the analysis of the regulators’ 
contribution as discussed in Chapter 5 of the thesis. 
 
Chapter 2 revealed sharply the scarcity in knowledge management studies and highlighted the 
slant of research towards private sector problems and the limited research in the public sector, 
particularly from a regulatory standpoint. Accordingly, Chapter 2 attested that KM theories of 
the private are applied in the private sector even when they are not entirely applicable. Due to 
the underdevelopment and lack of sufficient exploration of KM theories for the public sector, 
the incessant view that regulation and hence, public regulators constrain knowledge 
development for innovation thus remains empirically untested.  
 
The thesis used the regulated gambling industry and particularly the regulator in Mpumalanga 
to draw the empirical observations and analysis. The gambling industry was thus introduced in 
Chapter 3 and its networks of collaboration and knowledge development defined to determine 
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whether such encourage or constrain knowledge development and how they do that. In Chapter 
3 the multiple variables of collaboration including the stakeholders in the product development 
process were isolated and shown to include manufacturers, test laboratories, certifying 
authorities, regulators and the operators of gambling equipment.  
 
On the surface of the analysis, it appeared that the plurality of views in the product as imposed 
by regulation indeed stifled knowledge development and constrained innovation, hence 
aligning with the CET. However, this was not the absolute position since it was highlighted 
further in Chapter 3 that the views on regulation, knowledge development and innovation, 
largely depend on the side of the innovation spectrum these are gleaned and presented. For 
instance, Chapter 3 notes that manufacturers of products are eager to diffuse, hence lean 
towards a preference of minimal layers of evaluation. Whereas, regulators support multiple 
points of evaluation to build redundancy in the processes, hence developing maximum 
knowledge about the product which aids further innovation. The analysis in Chapter 3 showed 
the PO’s contribution to be bringing the basic concept and framework of the product, whilst 
the regulators brought the public interest perspective into the products features and attributes.   
 
The submissions in the thesis up to, and including Chapter 3; remained speculative in the 
absence of empirical observations to support them. As such, the empirical perspective was 
presented in Chapter 4 where empirical observations were covered from the public regulator. 
The empirical observations at the public regulator largely rebuffed the constraint view of 
regulation to knowledge development and innovation as proffered by CET, instead, it 
supported the Porter’s Hypothesis that, if formulated correctly, regulation aids the process. It 
was further found and shown that the orthodox view that public regulators do not ordinarily 
create knowledge but instead exploit it, is not always correct since the empirical evidence 
shows various processes of generating new knowledge. Such knowledge was also found to be 
shared with the manufacturers of the product and incorporated into the products as evidenced 
by the four key contributions by the regulator which later found themselves in the product 
attributes.  
 
The regulator’s processes and its resultant contribution were also found to have a sustainable 
impact on an industry-wide scale and set the tone for new entrants. The regulator was 
encouraging and supportive to its employees in respect of further study and continuous 
development, which is a key requirement for knowledge work and expert contributions. From 
the interviews conducted, the respondents attested to a high degree of autonomy and they 
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assertively painted strong sympathies towards making a contribution into products submitted 
to them for evaluation, instead of passively accepting submissions by the manufacturers.  
 
Notwithstanding the pro-knowledge development observations at the regulator, certain 
attitudes and practices that may hinder such were observable. These were mainly related to the 
formal power dynamics within the evaluation process of new products such as the EBT, in that, 
the levels with the most formal power made the least contribution of technical knowledge into 
the product, and vice versa. This phenomenon is demonstrated in Figure 12. As such, due to 
the poor technical understanding of the product, the powerful executives tend to misinterpret, 
misunderstand, and, or misrepresent technical findings and submissions by the lower level 
employees at operation and product level. This thus perpetuates the constraint and 
incompetence view (CET) of regulators since their contribution is ineptly presented by 
technically illiterate executives.  
 
The preceding Chapters of the thesis focused mainly on the analysis of the empirical 
observations. A major analytical input in Chapter 5 was the classification of the regulator as a 
PSF-MPB based on its organisation along hierarchical lines. In Chapter 5 regulators knowledge 
positioning, issues of context and collaboration were analysed and found to favourably align 
the public regulator with knowledge development for innovation.  
 
The four key contributions of the regulator are separated from the rest of the processes and 
other factors and individually analysed. All this led to a conclusion that the regulator cannot 
and should not be discounted as a mere consumer on knowledge, lest its key contributions will 
be missed and, or, misdiagnosed.  
This chapter therefore, respond directly to the questions posed by the thesis at the outset – 
which are; whether public regulators make a knowledge contribution or stifle it; and, any what 
is it that they contribute, and if they are consciously structured to support knowledge 
development. But more broadly, the question whether regulation supports or stifles innovation 
are summarised in this chapter. The implications of the regulator’s, and regulation’s posture 
for knowledge management, for the regulated gambling industry and general policy questions 
are considered herein. 
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7.2 Knowledge contribution, development, and innovation under regulation 
The regulated environment is a rich area of exploration and contestation of innovative ideas. 
The legislated provisions that establish the public regulator place a knowledge development 
burden on it which it must nurture on a perpetual basis. As per the definition of a public 
regulator espoused in this thesis, the establishment of public regulators is premised on the need 
for specialisation and expertise on a narrow area of authority. In the main, these are areas that 
are complex, yet require rapid and continuous implementation of public authority. In the first 
instance, the regulator cannot create regulatory requirements that it does not understand itself 
and cannot provide the rationale for such requirements. As such, the regulatory requirements 
that the regulated industry is subjected to, must be well researched and tested for need, 
feasibility and rationality before promulgation. It is hence common cause for regulatory bills 
to land in courts for arbitration.  
 
As a generic process, applicable in the legislative framework of South Africa, new legislation 
is subjected to public comments and exposed to brutal scrutiny, hence it is incumbent on the 
originators of such legislation to ensure their rationality. The process of soliciting public input 
is a form of collaboration and knowledge creation initiated by the regulator in most instances. 
It pools together inputs and review from various perspective comprised of industry players and 
any other interested party.   
 
Furthermore, once a regulation is promulgated it remains incumbent on the public regulator to 
ensure compliance with it by the regulated firms. When the regulator finds non-compliant 
behaviours in the industry, it must further ensure the existence of a punitive or corrective 
system, which also dictates a requirement for a specified type of knowledge. Therefore, a 
culture of perpetual knowledge development must be embedded in the regulator’s processes, 
and its employees must subscribe to such. This was found to be the case in the regulator 
considered in this thesis.  
 
As the expert in the field, the regulator is also found to serve as the primary and central 
repository of knowledge and historical information concerning the industry it regulates. As 
such it is a reference point for all regulated firms in the market, potential entrants, government, 
and scholars. This thus requires it to ensure high codification of knowledge and information 
concerning the industry. However, the regulator cannot codify that which it has not created, as 
such it must create the knowledge through processes of analysis, experimentation research. 
Therefore, irrespective of the origin – data, its analysis, preservation, retrieval, and presentation 
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are the primary currency of the regulatory agency, and must be treated as such. It is such data 
and the processes highlighted herein that will lead the creation and availability of the 
knowledge required by society from a regulator.  
 
Whilst knowledge is currently created on a continuous basis, there is a general lack of 
appreciation of the processes, the costs, and the value of this contribution by the regulator. As 
such, it is unable to quantify and communicate the value of it to the private sector, and society. 
This therefore continues to peddle the view that the regulator’s work is an unnecessary nuisance 
with no real contribution to products and society. Observations from the interviews have 
somewhat highlighted possible factors that perpetuate the negative stereotypes about 
regulators, in that it does not always use the relevant and appropriately skilled people to 
represent its work. Therefore, they come across as incoherent and incompetent. Accordingly, 
it is of critical importance that the regulator is able to attract, retain and develop professionals 
from a diversity of relevant fields. But most critically such people must be provided the 
autonomy and platform to represent the work of the regulator. 
 
I therefore, propose that where regulators are found to be incompetent, stifling, and costly to 
the innovation processes, such malfunction stems from a poor understanding, hence poor 
implementation of the regulatory mandate. Further issues, could be poorly defined objectives 
for regulating the industry. However, in the long run the legislated requirements will tend to 
correct the malfunctions, that is only if the objective and purpose of regulation was properly 
defined in the regulations. As a system of regulating industry behaviour, I argue based on the 
empirical evidence in this thesis, that knowledge development for innovation is embedded in 
the processes defined in legislation and even on the process of creating legislation itself.  
 
It thus cannot be subverted without tampering with the legislated processes and requirements 
in regulations. Therefore, inferior performance, regulatory capture and other inhibitors of 
innovation and knowledge development which are magnified by economic literature, are a 
function of the people implementing the regulations rather than the regulations. Naturally, 
organisations their practices, and regulations remain longer than the people in them, therefore 
at some point in the life of the organisation the innovation and knowledge development will be 
prioritised. 
 
I therefore proffer four cyclical dimensions of knowledge development for innovation in a 
regulated environment based on the empirical evidence which are learning, adapting, 
innovation and compliance. 
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Based on the EBT product considered, regulation and the regulator have shown themselves to 
be positive aspects of knowledge development and innovation phenomenon. The EBT case 
shows that regulation and the regulators, resolved a highly complicated codification 
conundrum and created a context and climate of collaboration, thereby propelling the product 
deeper into the diffusion area of Boisot’s I-space. 
7.3 Public and private sector knowledge management research 
As shown in the literature review anchor studies in knowledge development hence innovation, 
have tended to focus on the efforts of the private sector (e.g., Nonaka (1991), Nonaka and 
Takeuchi (1995), Szulanski (1996), Wiig (1993), and much later, Armistead & Meakins (2002) 
and Newell et. al. (2009). This approach has thus thrust the private sector as the singular most 
important driver of innovation and knowledge development across all sectors. As result of this, 
research, and conclusions on knowledge development for innovation has tended to reduce the 
public sector organisations to cameo contributors in this area.  
Through the knowledge contribution of the public sector, particularly the public regulator in 
regard, to the EBT, the study has succeeded in showing that, whilst the private sector is critical 
in knowledge development and innovation, public sector organisations are critical in further 
development of products and their fate post diffusion for general consumption. This finding 
thus supported and gave credence to the Schumpeter theory of learning espoused in Boisot 
(1998) that products are hypothesis and subject to further development. However, often further 
development is best served by the next innovating firm which views the product from a 
perspective vastly different from that of the initiator. For knowledge work and knowledge 
management, this thesis has highlighted that the public sector is, just like the private sector, is 
a rich resource for new perspectives on the management of knowledge for innovation.  
Furthermore, the study has emphasised and aligned itself with literature on the subject, 
particularly the school of thought that views context and specificity as crucial in the 
conclusions and assumptions about knowledge development. As such, whilst the study 
recommends that knowledge management research should also focus on public organisations, 
it also suggest that the research must be done within a narrow public-sector context e.g. 
agriculture, manufacturing, or manufacturing. Such a focus could in a small way perhaps 
reshape knowledge management theory and organisational practices and provide a more 
balanced view on the subject.  
Within the right context, and given the required support, resources, and appropriately skilled 
personnel at its disposal, regulation and regulators can also assist knowledge development and 
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innovation which augurs well economic and general development. As a knowledge 
development and innovation resource, regulation and regulators must be embraced, and as 
practically as possible, relieved from the political burdens and other ills besieging them. 
Furthermore, when they are being setup and configured, knowledge development and 
innovation must be amongst the main issues of consideration. The capacity to investigate, 
analyse, collaborate and report on issues relevant to a narrow area of focus must be built in 
their structures and perpetually monitored. Whilst their focus on curbing recalcitrant industry 
behaviour remains important, knowledge development and innovation must be advanced as 
elements that support such functions hence embedded in the practices.  
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Appendix 1 – Research Instrument 
 
SECTION A - KNOWLEDGE WORK AND THE KNOWLEDGE WORKER 
(INTERVIEW) 
In order for the regulator to make a knowledge contribution into innovation its activities must 
be characterised by an emphasis on theoretical knowledge, creativity and the use of analytical 
and social skills”.  As such, this section is aimed at determining the extent of knowledge and 
whether the employees are knowledge workers;  
1. Describe your current level of education, skills and experience? 
 
 
2. What is your current position at the regulator? 
 
 
3. How long have you held this position? 
 
 
4. Please explain the type of training, skills and experience required in order to 
successfully do this kind of work? 
 
 
4.1 Would you consider these esoteric skills? If so, why? 
 
 
4.2 Do you consider yourself an expert/specialist in this field? Please elaborate on your 
response? 
 
 
5. Please explain your degree of autonomy and decision making in regard to the execution of 
your work; for example; explain how the planning, execution and reporting process is 
structured,  
 
5.1 Also, describe the level and extent of involvement of your superior(s) in such 
processes;  
 
 
5.2 Describe the applicable decision making processes and layers; 
 
 
5.3 Give examples of decisions that you are authorised to take and implement and 
those that require your superiors’ approval;  
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SECTION B - ORGANISATIONAL CONTEXT (DOCUMENT 
REVIEW/INTERVIEW) 
1. Organisation structure  
Describe the organisational structure in terms of;  
1. Levels of hierarchy   
2. Work processes   
3. Rules, policies and procedures  
4. Supervision and control  
5. Decision making  
6. Co-ordination   
7. Form   
 
2. Training and development 
Describe the applicable professional development programs of the organisation; i.e. how does 
the organisation stay abreast with developments in the industry in terms of the following: 
1. Staff training  
2. Educational policies/ bursaries etc.  
3. Incentives for completed qualifications  
4. Leave   
5. Professional affiliations  
6. Conferences   
 
3. Knowledge management systems (document reviews)  
Describe the availability and access to the following ICT systems in the organisation. 
1. Internet  
2. Intranet   
3. e-mails   
4. Social media access  
5. Wi-fi   
6. Knowledge directories/repositories  
7 Telephone access  
8 Remote access   
9. Other  
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SECTION C - REQUIREMENTS FOR KNOWLEDGE WORK (INTERVIEWS) 
 
1. Knowledge processes 
 
1.1 Describe in detail what your work entails? 
 
 
1.2 Please explain the extent to which your work entails the creation of new knowledge? 
 
 
1.3 Generally, what processes do you follow in your department in the creation of new 
knowledge;  
 
 
1.4 In your view, is the creation of new knowledge important in the work that you do? 
 
 
1.4.1 If it is, why is it so and how often do you have to create new knowledge? 
 
 
1.5 Does your work generally require the conduct of experiments and tests? Please elaborate 
 
 
2. Knowledge projects 
 
2.1 To what extent is your work structured as project work, i.e. work with a set start and 
end time. Please elaborate your response;  
 
 
 
2.2 Would you say the EBT exhibited elements of a project? If it did, please explain the 
kind of project work that involved in the project;  
 
 
 
3. Knowledge creation and EBT 
 
3.1 Please describe in detail all the processes that were embarked upon when the EBT 
was received by your organisation.  
 
 
3.2 In regard to the EBT, did you conduct any experiments and/or tests as part of the 
evaluation for approval of the product? 
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3.3 Please explain your experiments and/or tests; highlighting amongst other things the 
basis and the purposes of such; 
 
 
3.4 Please explain your role and contribution in the design of the experiments and/or 
test of the EBT product.  
 
 
3.5 How did you know the kinds and scope of experiment and/or test to be conducted 
on the product? 
 
 
3.6 Are such experiments and/tests standard in evaluations of all products or these were 
designed specifically for the EBT? 
 
 
4. Collaboration, sharing and EBT  
 
4.1 In general, to what extent does your work require discussion with other people e.g. 
for the purposes of explanation; to obtain further information; presentation of new 
ideas etc. please elaborate your response as much as possible; 
 
 
4.2 In regard to the EBT, were you required or was it necessary to discuss the product 
with other parties to solicit their inputs and/or observations about it? 
 
If yes to 4.2 above;  
 
i. Please describe who were these parties, e.g. other regulators, colleagues within 
the organisation etc.; 
 
 
ii. Did you receive any input from these parties? If so did you find their input 
particularly that of other public regulators in the gambling industry valuable; 
 
 
iii. Did you incorporate such input in your evaluation of the EBT product for use in 
your province?  
 
 
4.3 How often do collaborate and share information with regulators on products such 
as the EBT? 
 
 
4.4 Would you say collaboration was an important part of your work in regard to the 
EBT? 
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5. Contribution into the EBT product 
 
5.1 In your view did your experiments, tests and/or evaluations identify any issues of 
which the initiator was not aware? If yes, please elaborate on these. 
 
 
5.2 In your view did your experiments, tests and/or evaluations identify any issues of 
concern/improvement on the EBT product.      
 
If no, to 5.2 above;  
 
i) Please elaborate on why do you think this was the case; 
 
 
ii) What is your comment on the tests, experiment and evaluation (i.e. do you 
believe that such were sufficient in identifying the important features of the 
product?) 
 
 
If yes to 5.2 above;  
 
iii) please elaborate on the issues identified; 
 
 
 
iv) If yes, were these issues/concern or improvement communicated to the 
initiator/submitter of the EBT product? 
 
 
5.3 In your observation, did the initiator address any of the issues of concern and 
change the EBT product in accordance to these. Please explain and elaborate on 
the changes made on the product; in the following aspects: 
 
i) Technical changes, e.g. size, shape, colours, features, functionality and any 
other visible and tangible changes; 
 
 
ii) Administratively, e.g. classification, applicable legislative framework, 
applicable gambling sector, operational requirements, future tests etc.  
 
 
5.4 Looking at the EBT now (2016), what would you say are the major technical and 
administrative changes on the product that are attributable to the contribution 
regulators and their knowledge management efforts? 
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5.5 Regulators are generally regarded as inhibitors of innovations due to their 
bureaucratic postures and perceive lack of knowledge and interest in innovation. 
What are your views regarding this statement?  
 
 
 
6. EBT related document review 
 
The document review will focus on the following: 
1. Correspondence between regulator and initiator; 
2. Internal reports produced by the regulator in relation to the EBT product; 
3. Developments in applicable legislation;  
4. Technical requirements regarding EBT; and 
5. Court cases/judgements between public regulators, initiators and other interested 
parties.  
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